

Chapter 13: Former Yugoslavia and Its Successors
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It is impossible to compress the story of the Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia [SFRY] and its successor states into a neat and simple story of transition. Its succession twists and turns through pathways of war, reconstruction and reconstitution into national states – a process not yet completed. In this contentious tale, observers sharply differ on the sources of dissolution, the causes of war, and the current state and future prospects of the post-Yugoslav governments.¹

The tragedies that occurred are all the more painful since it seemed, in 1990, that the SFRY was on the verge of joining the European Community. It had long ago done away with many of the overtly repressive trappings of Central and East European socialism. Since the 1950s, Yugoslav leaders had been experimenting with liberalizing economic and political reforms, and Yugoslavia had been broadly integrated into international economic, political and cultural developments. Yugoslavia's socialist regime was more open, transparent, and accepting of non-Marxist ideologies than any in Central and Eastern Europe. And since the 1960s, its citizens had massively enjoyed the opportunities to travel, study and work abroad.² Literature and culture forbidden in the east, from George Orwell's *1984* to punk rock and neo-liberal economics, were long prominent in Yugoslav stores.

By 1989, Yugoslav efforts to find a “third way” between western capitalism and Soviet socialism had clearly run into a dead end. A burgeoning civil society, a business-oriented prime minister, and the popular Slovenian cry, “*Europa Zdaj!*” or “Europe Now!” appeared to move Yugoslavia toward an evolving Europe. But Yugoslavia's other

republics and provinces did not share Slovenia's relatively smooth ascension to the EU and have remained outside the "European Home."

This chapter will explore the causes and consequences of the SFRY's demise. It will suggest that the agenda for the dissolution of multinational Yugoslavia was set by a series of incomplete economic and political reforms that left Yugoslavia without the institutional resilience to overcome increasing inter-regional differences. The national revivals that unevenly swept across Yugoslavia in the 1980s enabled the rise of the uniquely talented leader Slobodan Milosevic, who advanced Serbian interests in the name of preserving Yugoslavia. The 'Wars of Yugoslav Succession' were the outcome of: unequal bargaining in the absence of compelling central authority, the failure of ambitious republican leaders to find a basis for future common existence, and the initial disinterest of Europe and the United States. Yugoslavia's violent dissolution led to a delayed international intervention, settlements that have helped to define the newly independent states, the prominence of international agencies in domestic developments, and to transitions that have lasted far longer than had been foreseen in the early 1990s.

Pre-communist History

The extraordinarily heterogeneous cultural, social and political pre-communist traditions in the lands of the former Yugoslavia stem from their location amidst the divisions in Europe between: the eastern and western Roman empires; eastern Orthodoxy, western Catholicism and Islam; the Ottoman Empire, the Republic of Venice and the Habsburg Monarchy; and the Warsaw Treaty Organization and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.³ Nineteenth century national movements appeared on the heels of wars, invasions, population movements, shifting boundaries and religious conversion.

Many current national leaders have focused intently on the historical antecedents to the post-Yugoslav, national states. The medieval Croatian, Serbian and Bosnian states were relatively brief preludes to their integration into larger, imperial state structures. An agreement with the Hungarian throne in 1102 led to a separate but unequal existence for Croatia within the Hungarian Kingdom until 1918, which put them under the Habsburg Monarchy after 1526. The battle on Kosovo field in 1389 between Serbian and Ottoman forces led to the ultimate end of medieval Serbia in 1459. By the time that Serbian power again controlled this area in the early part of the 20th century, Serbs were greatly outnumbered by Albanians in Kosovo. The Ottoman forces conquered independent Bosnia in 1463 and Herzegovina in 1483. The Slovenes lost their political independence in the eighth century and were incorporated into the Habsburg Monarchy by the 14th century. Macedonia did not enjoy independence during the medieval era and fell under Byzantine, Bulgarian, Ottoman and Serbian rule in the period before World War I. The departure of the Serbian state northward after 1389 enabled the development of a Montenegrin state where the bishops of the Orthodox Church became rulers after 1516.

The legacies of imperial rule continue to be felt in these lands. The Ottomans imposed a centrally controlled regime of land tenure, tax collection and native religious rights that gave extensive autonomy to religious communities. Large-scale conversions to Islam took place only among Bosnians and Albanians, but the forced conversion of young boys to Islam for the Ottoman officer corps remains a potent anti-Islamic symbol. The Ottomans twice advanced to the gates of Vienna and the Habsburg court and administration: in 1529 and 1682. In response to the Ottoman threats, the Habsburgs established a Military border populated largely by Orthodox Serbs on the Croatian side of

Bosnia-Herzegovina. The aspirations of the Habsburg Monarchy in the 18th century to impose enlightened absolutism and bureaucratic uniformity did not succeed in providing a unifying link within the empire – especially as the Croatian lands did not constitute a single administrative entity in the pre-Yugoslav period. Similarly, Ottoman efforts at internal reform throughout the nineteenth century did not provide a basis for reviving the authority of the center in these far-flung parts of the empire. By the eve of World War I the Austro-Hungarian Dual Monarchy was neither a vital nor authoritative state, and in the first Balkan War in 1912-13, the Ottoman Empire had been pushed out of the Balkans by an alliance consisting of Bulgaria, Greece, Serbia and Montenegro.

This imperial decline was made possible by the ideas of the enlightenment and the romantic movements and the Napoleonic revolution of the early 19th century, which led to the emergence of modern national movements among the peoples of the former Yugoslavia that were rooted in the language and culture of the common people. As discussed below, contending notions of the Yugoslav state combined with the uneven appearance of national movements in the nineteenth century. Serbia was the first state to emerge in a series of uprisings against the Ottomans that began in 1804 and that culminated in formal independence at the Congress of Berlin in 1878. It gained experience in administration, in exercising influence in the region and in its difficult relations with the government of the Habsburg Dual Monarchy. The small and poor state of Montenegro also gained international recognition in 1878 in Berlin as a separate government under Russian tutelage. Independence movements in the different parts of Croatia and Slovenia were constrained by their relative weakness within the Habsburg state and by a shifting set of goals that were rooted in some form of pan-south Slav

federalism, liberalism, integral nationalism, and an enhanced position within the Habsburg Monarchy. At the Congress of Berlin, the Dual Monarchy took over the administration of Bosnia and, to great Serbian protest, formally annexed it in 1908. In the first Balkan War, the Ottomans lost both Kosovo to Serbia and Macedonia to a larger coalition. But the second Balkan War saw Serbia annex a great deal of Macedonia from Bulgaria. The end of the first World War created conditions for the formation of a common state for Serbs, Croats, Slovenes, Bosnian Muslims and Montenegrins, but that would also house significant numbers of Albanians, Hungarians, Turks, Italians and others, as well.

The decline of the Ottomans and the Habsburgs set an agenda that did not favor the emergence of democratic institutions following World War I because of many unanswered questions in economic development, administration, cultural policy and foreign policy. In his magisterial work, Ivo Banac suggests “The national question permeated every aspect of Yugoslavia’s public life after 1918. It was reflected in the internal, external, social, economic and even cultural affairs. It was solved by democrats and autocrats, kings and Communists. It was solved by day and unsolved by night. Some days were particularly bright for building, some nights particularly dark for destroying. One horn of the dilemma was that a single solution could not satisfy all sides. Was the other that a firm citadel could be maintained only by human sacrifice?”⁴

The Communist Experience

The felicitous title of Dennison Rusinow’s superb *The Yugoslav Experiment*, effectively captures socialist Yugoslavia’s policy of permanent political improvisation.⁵ The Communist-led Partisans’ seizure of power during World War II, with minimal

assistance from the Soviet Union, began a search for a governing formula that would combine an efficient and equitable strategy of economic development with an approach to governance balanced between the leadership of a Leninist party and the broad inclusion of mass organizations. The Communists' capacity to mobilize mass and external support during World War II provided the new regime, led by Josip Broz Tito, with the resilience that was absent in other Central and East European socialist regimes to resist the domination of their internal political and policy agendas by the Soviet Union. This toughness was essential for the experiments in governance that were conducted in an unusual international environment, and that addressed economic decision making and organization, and the evolution of national communities within the Yugoslav federation.

In the first element of the experiment, socialist Yugoslavia found itself in a unique international environment in which it was a member neither of the Warsaw Treaty Organization nor NATO, where it was viewed as a communist country in the west and as a capitalist country in the east. Stalin's expulsion of Yugoslavia from the Communist Information Bureau or COMINFORM in 1948 provided a context to search for a legitimizing formula that would leave Yugoslavia both independent and socialist.⁶ Military spending increased from the necessity to maintain a Yugoslav National Army (JNA) that could deter attack. While the top officer corps was ethnically balanced, the middle and noncommissioned officer corps was dominated by Serbs and Montenegrins – a matter of great significance as most Yugoslav military assets fell to the Serbs during the wars of succession in the 1990s.

By the early 1960s, the Yugoslav government under Tito had adopted an “open” foreign policy between the two Cold War blocs and the newly independent countries in

the developing world in which it came to play a prominent role in the movement of nonaligned countries.⁷ Tito's Yugoslavia actively pursued an independent political course within the United Nations. It simultaneously traded extensively with communist bloc countries and developed relations with multilateral financial institutions, such as the International Monetary Fund. It opened up its borders so that by the early 1970s, over a million Yugoslav citizens lived and worked abroad. From the early 1950s, in other words, an increasingly diverse set of foreign relationships helped maintain Yugoslav independence and came to shape the character of internal policy choices.⁸ However, by the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, Yugoslavia had ceased to represent a daring experiment that commanded western and eastern support.

The second element of the experiment lay in a strategy of economic development that was socialist but non-Soviet. Abandoning central planning early on, Yugoslav leaders adopted "self-management" decision making within firms as the regime's central economic symbol. From the early 1950s onward, Yugoslav leaders engaged in a series of partial economic reforms that fell short of creating a market economy similar to those in Europe or North America. These reforms included the de-collectivization of agriculture; the decentralization of economic decision making; the establishment of workers' councils in firms; liberalization of foreign trade; banking reforms; the creation of a Fund for the Development of Underdeveloped Regions; efforts to simulate or create financial, commodity and labor markets; efforts to remove the LCY from everyday decision making in the economy; the redesign of the economy in the mid-1970s into a "contractual economy;" and a policy of liberalizing "shock therapy" in 1990.⁹

The reforms did not work very well over the medium term, mainly because they neither fully embraced the implications of liberalizing reforms that would lead to significant privatization of economic assets nor ensured that the economy would remain 'socialist.' They did not provide stable economic growth based on a productive agriculture. Instead of narrowing intra-Yugoslav inequality, they were associated with increased economic inequality across and within republics. They appeared to increase Yugoslav dependence on the international economy, led to significantly increasing unemployment and the wholesale departure of labor to jobs in the west, and continued political meddling in production. By 1990, Yugoslav debt to western banks had grown to US\$20 Billion. Unemployment reached 15.9 percent and, in the least developed region, Kosovo, was 38.4 percent.¹⁰ At one point in 1989, inflation had grown to 1750 percent. In the best of political times the Yugoslav government might have overcome these difficulties, but by 1991 it was the worst of times.

The final element of the experiment lay in political reforms that were embodied in large-scale efforts to define new constitutional orders in 1946, 1954, 1963, and 1974. Among other things, these constitutions attempted to devolve power away from the Communist Party of Yugoslavia (CPY) to mass organizations that were more sensitive to diverse popular aspirations. Signs of this devolution included renaming the party the League of Communists of Yugoslavia (LCY) at its sixth congress in 1952, taking the party out of a command position in the mid-1960s by investing more authority in the regional organizations, and purging the hardline secret police. The LCY leadership attempted to enhance the authority of non-party governmental and administrative institutions, but stopped short of divorcing the party from power. The purges of liberal

party leaders throughout Yugoslavia in the early 1970s led to the re-Leninization of party organizations that became incubators of the fractious nationalism they were meant to eliminate. This party-led regionalism provided a context to end the Yugoslav experiment in brotherhood and unity, the dissolution of the state, and war.

The idea of ‘Brotherhood and Unity’ was also central to the Yugoslav experiment. Yugoslavia was an “unmelted pot” of Muslims, Orthodox, and Catholics; Serbs, Croats, Slovenes, Bosniacs,¹¹ Macedonians, and Montenegrins; Albanians, Hungarians, Italians, Slovaks, Czechs, Turks, and others. These peoples had acquired their modern national consciousness within the Habsburg Monarchy and the Ottoman Empire. Their modern national movements began at different times throughout the nineteenth century and with different degrees of success. The idea of creating some sort of state for all the South Slavs or Yugoslavia was also in the mix. But even the nineteenth century saw tensions between the idea of creating an overarching, primordial common identity against that in which a Yugoslav identity would merely bind together national groups sharing a common political space. This tension characterized political debates between centralizing “unitarists” and decentralizing “federalists” in both royalist and socialist Yugoslavia. And there was nothing inevitable about the creation of the “Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes” at the end of World War I, an entity that became known as “Yugoslavia” in 1929 whose Serbian royal dictatorship tried to push a common cultural Yugoslav identity that was in practice Serb-dominated. Serb-Croat political conflicts wracked the country right up until its dismemberment by the Nazis in 1941 into puppet regimes in Slovenia, Croatia and Serbia, and the annexation of Kosovo, Macedonia and parts of Croatia by neighboring countries with their own claims to these regions. The Communist-led

Partisans won the civil war that took place during World War II in good measure because the symbol of Yugoslav “Brotherhood and Unity” was a supranational appeal to reason and survival.

To recognize and balance national interests, the SFRY was a federation of six republics: Serbia, Croatia, Montenegro, Slovenia, Macedonia and Bosnia-Herzegovina. Bosnia-Herzegovina, the only republic without a titular nation, was a “community of Moslems, Croats and Serbs.” There were two autonomous provinces within Serbia: Vojvodina, which was home to large numbers of Hungarians, and Kosovo, which had been predominantly Albanian since the end of the World War II.¹² Croatia’s population was 12 percent Serb in 1991. Many Serbs in Croatia lived in compact settlements in areas that comprised the Habsburg military border from the sixteenth century and others in large urban settlements. The Serbs were the SFRY’s most dispersed nationality; more Serbs lived outside of their nominal republic than any other ethnic group.

Successive constitutions defined a series of increasingly complex power-sharing arrangements between federal, republican and regional governments that came to resemble consociational institutions theorized to build stable democracies in culturally plural societies.¹³ By 1974, the pattern of representation in all federal-level decision making bodies was carefully allotted to individuals from each republic (with attention paid to the intra-republican nationality composition of such delegations), in order to insure the formal picture of federal multi-nationalism. There was an intricate pattern of inter-republican decision making, wherein republican and provincial representatives in state and government institutions held a virtual veto over each stage of federal decision making.¹⁴ All federal-level institutions were guided by the ethnic key. The presidency,

parliamentary delegations, and cabinets included representatives of all republics and autonomous provinces. Under the 1974 constitution, the republics became the SFRY's most significant centers of power. But decentralization of politics left the LCY as "the one ring to bind them all," in Rusinow's phrase, despite its loss of political coherence.

Tito also tried to ensure that the country would remain unified by establishing a collective state presidency in 1971. Thus, each republic seat had a member to serve as part of the collective head of state. The President of the State presidency, which Tito held until his death, rotated among the republics and provinces each May according to a pre-determined rotation.

With Tito's death in 1980, the fragility of this house of cards became increasingly apparent. As the winds of change began sweeping through socialist Europe, official Yugoslav politics remained committed to the methods of economic and political half-reforms of the earlier socialist era. The bankruptcy of politics as usual could be seen in the suppression of demonstrations calling for republican status in Kosovo, in trumped up show trials of Bosnian Moslems for ostensibly advocating an Islamic republic, and in a series of other public "political cases" that were meant to demonstrate the strength of the political center against disloyal enemies. But the absence of an authoritative political center was exposed in the failure of successive federal governments to identify an effective strategy of economic development and in the failure of republican oligarchs to agree on amendments to the 1974 constitution. The loss of a central vision was clearest in the failure of the Yugoslav Presidency to act with any independent authority and the minor role relegated to Federal Prime Minister Markovic in the political drama of

succession. The torch had passed to republican leaders who were unable to reach agreement on a constructive course forward.

Most ominously, this political impasse led to the rise of Slobodan Milosevic in Serbian politics in a 1987 coup against his close friend and political patron, Ivan Stambolic. Milosevic revolutionized Yugoslav politics as the first party leader to depart from a convoluted and ideological public language to simple and direct rhetoric that was comprehensible to the broad masses. He explicitly integrated Serbian national goals into an “anti-bureaucratic revolution” that was supposed to preserve socialist Yugoslavia. Aside from taking over the Serbian media, Milosevic employed sophisticated techniques of mass mobilization to make credible threats against the socialist governments in Slovenia and Croatia after he had put his loyal minions in power in Kosovo, Vojvodina, and Montenegro, thereby giving him political control over four of the eight Yugoslav political units. This tactic made him the single most influential political force in late socialist Yugoslavia, but he lacked both Tito’s goal of inclusion and his command of the levers of power. Still, he was the commanding force in Serbian politics until his electoral defeat in Autumn 2000 and arrest by the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia – a decade after the first window of democratic transition closed.¹⁵

The silver lining to this political cloud might have been the opening up of civil society throughout Yugoslavia in the middle and late 1980s. This process involved publicly confronting previously suppressed conflicts and official excesses, and beginning multiple processes of reconciliation. In theory, a new democratic politics would be inclusive and strive to integrate all citizens and groups into a series of nested political communities that began locally and grew outwards to the federation. In practice, it

opened a Pandora's box and sometimes resulted in such inflammatory programs as the Serbian Academy of Sciences' "Memorandum" of 1986 that gave a cogent critique of economic mismanagement alongside a nationalist program aimed at protecting Serbs throughout Yugoslavia. The increasing openness of Yugoslav society meant that former officials and political prisoners could gather at meetings of UJDI – the Association of Yugoslav Democratic Initiative – to search for common ground for the future. It meant the return of *gastarbeiteri*, or Yugoslav guest workers who had been working abroad, and the entry of political émigrés into a rapidly evolving political mainstream. It meant coming to terms with the transnational character of ethno-political communities in the 1980s and '90s – whether in the selection of an American citizen, Milan Panic, as the Serbian Prime Minister in 1992, the prominent role played by overseas Croats in Croatian domestic politics in the 1990s, or in the substantial support of Albanian émigré communities for political and military action in Kosovo.

Greater pluralism combined with mounting economic problems to deepen the antagonism between political and economic development strategies pursued in the more economically developed regions (Slovenia and Croatia) and the less economically developed regions.¹⁶ Slovenian and Croatian elites favored a looser, asymmetrical federation together with liberal political and economic reforms. Serbian leaders countered with reforms calling for a re-centralization of the state and political system together with a streamlined self-management system. Each of these plans suited the self-interest of the regionally rooted elites who proposed it. Forces for compromise – Federal Prime Minister Markovic and leaders of the lesser developed and ethnically diverse republics of Bosnia and Macedonia – were easily drowned out. Already disgruntled over having to foot what

they considered more than their fair share of the bill for central government and economic development in poorer regions of the country, leaders in Slovenia and Croatia in the late 1980s balked when asked to contribute to Serbia's strong-arm tactics over restive Kosovo. Fearing they would lose the battle with Belgrade over reform of Yugoslavia, the Slovenian party elite in 1989 saw the benefit of "giving in" to the increasing demands of republic youth and intellectuals for pluralism and sovereignty. The pursuit of liberal reform was more contentious in Croatia, where twelve percent of the population was Serb and reformers only gained the upper hand at the end of 1989.

By 1989, the pressure for comprehensive change was great. The federal LCY ceased to exist in January 1990 when the Croat and Slovene delegations walked out of the Fourteenth Extraordinary Congress of the LCY after the Serbian bloc rejected all Slovene motions – e.g., to confederalize the party, to ban use of torture, to provide clearer guarantees of the right of dissociation – without any meaningful discussion. Most former republican LCY organizations soon morphed into Social Democratic Parties [SDPs].¹⁷ This development did not auger a happy outcome to the intense, inter-republican political bargaining about Yugoslavia's future architecture. For the first time since World War II, nationalist ideas were viewed as legitimate, and nationalist "enemies" of socialism became centrally important actors in Yugoslav politics. By 1991, few political or institutional constraints were commonly accepted throughout Yugoslavia. There was also a sense that the window of political opportunity would not remain open long. The Serbian government viewed itself as the protector of Serbs throughout the former Yugoslavia, and Croatian President Tudjman would soon make the error to try to extend Croatia into Bosnia.

State-Formation and War

The Yugoslav government barely paused at the precipice of dissolution and war in 1990 and 1991. As described in more detail below, elections throughout the federation in 1990 selected republican leaderships who were accountable to ethnically based republican constituencies. These leaders failed to reach consensus on the shape of a democratic Yugoslav federation. Slovenian and Croatian leaders held well-orchestrated referenda on independence and began transforming their reserve forces into armies. European mediators failed to prevent a war at this “hour of Europe,” and the US government was not sufficiently interested at this early moment to act.¹⁸ Five interconnected armed conflicts took place that still cast long shadows on developments in the successor states. It has been difficult to establish precise figures, but estimates of people killed for the entire conflict range from 200,000 to 300,000 people. Over four and a half million people were displaced at some point in the conflicts. As of the end of 2002, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees estimated that over a million refugees and IDPs were still seeking durable solutions by returning home.¹⁹

Slovenia

The Slovene Government declared independence on June 25, 1991, following careful preparations for defense that effectively stymied an ill-prepared JNA (federal army) offensive. By June 30th, Serbian leaders ordered the JNA to prepare to abandon Slovenia. There were eight military and five civilian deaths among the Slovenes, and 39 members of the JNA died. Slovenian independence was formally acknowledged on July 18.²⁰

Croatia

The Croatian government declared independence on June 26, 1991. Following its initially artful invitation to the leader of the Serb Democratic Party to become a Vice President in the Croatian Government in Spring 1990, the Tudjman Government awkwardly began firing Serb administrators and police throughout Croatia in the name of achieving ethnic balance in official employment. Armed conflict began in 1990 with a series of skirmishes and the Serbs' consolidation of control in the illegally constituted Serb Autonomous Regions with the aid of JNA officers and arms by mid-March 1991. Croatian Serbs largely boycotted the Croatian referendum on independence. The war featured sieges of Croatia's Danubian city of Vukovar and the Adriatic city of Dubrovnik. Former US Secretary of State and UN negotiator Cyrus Vance devised a plan that allowed 13,500 UN troops to deploy to oversee the reintegration of the one-third of the republic's territory controlled by Serbs into Croatia.²¹ An estimated 20,000 people died during the war. Despite EC concerns over the Croatian government's treatment of its Serb minority, Germany recognized Croatia's independence in early 1992; the United States and other European governments soon followed.

International negotiators from the UN, the EC, the US, and Russia presided over three years of inconclusive negotiations between the Croatian Government and rebel Serbs, who repeatedly refused to begin talks concerning the reintegration of Serb-held territory into Croatia in accordance with the Vance Plan. The Croatian government launched two offensives to re-gain control of most Serb-held territory in May and August 1995 after which approximately 300,000 Serbs fled Croatia.²² As part of the larger process of ending the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina, UNTAES (UN Transitional Administration in Eastern Slavonia) mediated the formal return of territory by early 1998. The Organization of

Security and Cooperation in Europe has remained to monitor aspects of policing, media and return of refugees. The Croatian government's reassertion of control over its entire territory by 1998 was a turning point that removed the issue of Serb occupation, allowed for the rise of issues of corruption, abuse of power, and economic development, and set the stage for a second wave of democratization.

Bosnia-Herzegovina

By Autumn 1991, a delicately balanced coalition government among Muslim, Serb and Croat parties broke down with disputes over Bosnia's relationship to rump Yugoslavia and the departure of the Serb Democratic Party delegation, led by Radovan Karadzic, and the formation of multiple Serb Autonomous Regions with JNA support. Croatian President Tudjman had already discussed the partition of Bosnia-Herzegovina with Serbian President Milosevic by March 1991, in an initiative that would betray Croatia's image as a victim of aggression, strengthen the hand in Bosnia of radically nationalist Croats in Herzegovina, and establish the "territorial integrity of the Croat nation in its historic and natural borders" in a way that would expand the Tudjman government's influence in Bosnia.²³

The Bosnian government's declaration of independence was recognized by several western governments on April 6, 1992. Initial Serb campaigns in 1992 rapidly led to the capture of about 60 per cent of Bosnia's territory, gains that remained basically intact until the fighting ended in Autumn 1995. In an attempt to homogenize Bosnia's ethnically complex social geography in order to control territory, the Serb military engaged in ethnic cleansing²⁴ and created prisoner camps. The radical HVO (Croatian Defense Council) subsequently launched offensives in Herzegovina and central Bosnia.

Radicalized by foreign Muslim volunteers, a Muslim brigade in central Bosnia also committed crimes. Both Serb and Croat forces destroyed Islamic cultural monuments.²⁵

The war generated two and one half million refugees and internally displaced persons.

The international community proved to be ineffective at ending the war. The United Nations Security Council passed over 100 normative acts that established an arms embargo that de facto favored the well-armed Bosnian Serb Army against the poorly equipped Army of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, created six poorly defended “safe areas” for civilians, and addressed daily crises in the provision of humanitarian assistance and protection of civilians. Concurrently, diplomatic negotiators from the EC, UN, US, and others drafted a series of peace plans, but took few steps to compel the parties to reach agreement, and did not intervene in support of the elected Bosnian Government. The UN Security Council deployed 26,000 lightly armed troops in the UN Protection force (UNPROFOR) scattered throughout Bosnia-Herzegovina during the fighting in support of humanitarian efforts. But these troops were not in position to compel compliance with the UN mandate and were, in effect, at the mercy of the strongest party on the ground, i.e, the Bosnian Serb Army. International negotiators succeeded in compelling Croat forces in Herzegovina and the Bosnian Government to cooperate against Serb forces by forming a Federation in early 1994. By mid-1995, Serb forces became increasingly assertive, culminating in their conquest of Srebrenica in the largest single post WW II European massacre. Immediately afterward, NATO air intervention and a Bosniac-Croat offensive ended the fighting and led to US-led negotiations in Dayton Ohio in November 1995. Most estimates hold that between 200,000 and 300,000 people died in the conflict.

The US-led negotiations in Dayton Ohio resulted in peace accords that created a Bosnia that largely recognized the “facts” created on the ground by the war. Bosnia now consists of an unwieldy configuration of two entities: Republika Srpska (RS) (49 percent) and the Bosniac-Croat Federation (51 percent), each with its own police and army. The RS is relatively centralized, while the Federation is composed of ten cantons with substantial autonomy. Two cantons are explicitly mixed; three cantons are dominated by Croats; and five cantons are dominated by Bosniacs. A large NATO military implementation force and complex civilian intervention began in early 1996, and its work is continued by a force led by the European Union. The High Representative oversees efforts to implement the Dayton Peace Accords by the United Nations, the European Union, the OSCE, the World Bank, and a host of non-governmental organizations. The High Representative won extraordinary powers at a meeting of the Peace Implementation Committee in Bonn in December 1997, which enable him to override Bosnian institutions to pass legislation and remove domestic officials from office.²⁶

Kosovo

Kosovo has long been an area of discord between Serbs and Albanians. It served both as the center of the medieval Serbian state and as the birthplace of the modern Albanian national movement in the nineteenth century. In the period immediately after World War II, the Serbian-dominated secret police imposed a harsh anti-Albanian order in Kosovo; in the 1950s the situation was so bad that many Albanians declared themselves Turks and emigrated to Turkey. The pendulum swung in the other direction after the fall of Secret Police Chief Rankovic in 1966 and by 1974, Kosovo had become almost an equal member of the Federation, and Albanians were the leading ethnic group in the province.

But beginning with demonstrations in 1981, the pendulum again began swinging back against Albanian interests. Between 1988 and 1990, the Serbian government took steps to limit Kosovo's autonomy. It forced the province's two top leaders to resign, forced the legislature to adopt amendments reducing the province's autonomy, suppressed the Assembly and the Executive Council, terminated Albanian language instruction in the schools, caused well over a 100,000 Kosovo Albanians to lose their jobs in the administrative, education, and health sectors, and changed street names in the capital, Pristina, to Serbian ones. These measures led to large-scale emigration from Kosovo and were accompanied by official efforts to resettle Serbs (including refugees from Croatia) into Kosovo.²⁷

In response to these developments, a peaceful movement for autonomy and then for independence developed, headed by the Democratic League of Kosovo or LDK under the leadership of Ibrahim Rugova. In parallel elections, the LDK won the broad support of Albanians in Kosovo. It established a parallel administration in education and health care widely that was used and supported by Albanians. However, Rugova did not succeed in winning a place at any international negotiating table beyond that of an observer, partly because international negotiators viewed Milosevic as essential in ending other conflicts. This failure created the conditions for a more militant phase to the national movement when the Kosovo Liberation Army or KLA took the initiative in support of independence for Kosovo. Beginning with terrorist activities against Serbian police stations in December 1997, the KLA began more sustained operations, which elicited increasingly harsh response from Serbian forces. International diplomatic efforts to establish an OSCE Verification Mission in the autumn of 1998 did not succeed in deterring further violence.

The failure of the Rambouillet negotiations in France in early 1999 led to a 77 day NATO air campaign against Serbia and Serb positions in Kosovo, and to more intense ethnic cleansing of Albanians from Kosovo. The campaign ended on June 10th with UN Security Council Resolution 1244 that created an interim administration for Kosovo meant to provide a framework for a political settlement of the crisis.

The UN Mission in Kosovo, or UNMIK, had some initial success in deploying in Kosovo, but has not succeeded in establishing institutions that are effective at providing security or the rule of law; brokering an agreement between the authorities in Kosovo and in Serbia over Kosovo's future status; providing guarantees to minorities concerning security, education and economic opportunity; and meeting a generally accepted level of good governance.²⁸ The failure of the authorities in Belgrade to negotiate realistically about the future of Kosovo contributes to the continued uncertainty and violence in the province that results in the continuing departure of active Serb population from Kosovo. Macedonia

The enduring sources of the Macedonian Question, including Bulgarian, Greek, and Yugoslav claims to the region, have not figured into the ethnic conflict between Macedonians and Albanians in the period since 1990.²⁹ Albanians constitute 25 percent of the population of Macedonia and inhabit the area in the northwest bordering on Kosovo and Albania and in the capital, Skopje.³⁰ A "policy of half-hearted, half-reluctant ethnic cohabitation" in a series of multiethnic coalition governments since the early 1990s helped maintain a fragile peace but did not provide a basis for integrating the two groups into a common community.³¹ Nor did the international presence of the UN Preventative Deployment (UNPREDEP) in Serbia and Macedonia, the EC, or CSCE in the

mid-1990s lead to political integration. These delaying actions led to a series of skirmishes in 2001 in northwest Macedonia between Albanian guerillas supported by Kosovar irregulars and Macedonian forces. After several months, international diplomats brokered the Ohrid Agreement, which provides for constitutional amendments and reforms to improve the status Albanians while maintaining the unity of the Macedonian state. NATO briefly deployed in Macedonia in order to collect weapons; an OSCE mission remains in place.

The failure of the international community to act in a timely fashion in the late 1980s and early 1990s, then, contributed to the uncertainty that permitted stronger and more aggressive forces to gain strength and undermined efforts to move towards peace and the construction of normal political systems. The wars of Yugoslav succession have made the transition in the countries of the former Yugoslavia significantly different from those in other parts of Central and Eastern Europe. The transition from war to peace has severely complicated the transition from socialism. The influence of the wars becomes clearer when we survey domestic developments, including elite transformation, party politics, the development of civil society, attitudes towards politics, and economic development and policies.

Political Transitions and Political Institutions

The Wars of Yugoslav Succession have left a deep imprint on the patterns of elite transformation in the successor states. Old and new leaderships easily blended together. Many former Communists, such as Serbian President Milosevic, Croatian President Tudjman, Macedonian President Gligorov, became nationalist leaders in the new regimes. Many former democratic dissidents also became nationalist leaders and

ideologues. Some former nationalists became liberal, democratic human rights advocates. Returning political émigrés blended effectively with former communists in nationalist parties. Among the older generation, former communists were able to work easily with former nationalist “enemies.” Younger, able and politically nimble politicians and administrators rose quickly to prominence in all parties and states. A careful examination of elite transformation in Croatia, Serbia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Kosovo would certainly show how nationalist leaders employed the wars to deepen their hold on power and expand political machines that limited significant inter-party electoral conflict. The wars thus delayed political democratization and economic liberalization.

The international community also contributed in some ways to this delay. The command systems that were established during the wars facilitated alliances between external agencies and the warring parties at the expense of the citizens for whom the assistance was intended. For example, during the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the warring parties took a cut from all humanitarian aid intended for civilians as part of their war effort.³² After peace agreements, “peace building” international agencies tacitly helped to buttress the authority of corrupt ethnic leaders simply by dealing with them. The peace accords in Kosovo and Bosnia-Herzegovina have not settled disputes about sovereignty or provided a road map to stable and democratic institutions. The failure to resolve open issues – e.g., the status of Kosovo, the capture of indicted war criminals, the return of refugees and displaced persons, or the relationship between Republika Srpska and Serbia – ensured that recalcitrant leaders would find little reason to commit to the implementation of the peace accords. Finally, many important domestic functions were taken over by international officials from the UN, OSCE, Office of the High

Representative and the EU. These individuals generally spoke none of the languages of the region, knew little about the region, and generally often had little experience in working in post-conflict zones. As a result, their actions have often made the transition even more difficult.

By 2006, all former Yugoslav regions had adopted proportional representation (PR) electoral systems, and all but Bosnia and Kosovo could be described as parliamentary democracies with largely symbolic presidents. However, most did not start the postcommunist period that way. Domestic and international forces helped alter the distribution of power between the president and the parliament, as well as the electoral systems of the former Yugoslav states. For example, as indigenous democratic forces gained strength in Croatia and Serbia, they weakened their countries' presidencies, which had been abused to undermine democracy, by building up and increasing the independence of non-presidential political institutions. In Croatia, they also jettisoned the single-member district system and adopted the more inclusive and representative PR system.

Institutional engineering was the most elaborate in those regions of the Former Yugoslavia that experienced significant international intervention. There, international diplomats compelled the adoption of sophisticated power-sharing arrangements that they hoped would ensure members of all ethnic groups a stake in the post-conflict political systems. At the end of war in Bosnia, international institutional designers developed an incredibly complex and rigid set of multi-layered political institutions that enshrined ethnic power-sharing in the Collective Presidency as well as in most other political and administrative institutions. International engineers induced the adoption of PR systems in

Macedonia and Kosovo, as well as the redrawing of electoral district lines in Macedonia, to give better chances to minorities and small parties. In addition to drafting Bosnia's elaborate rules for representation of all major ethnicities, international officials compelled Kosovo to reserve parliamentary seats for minorities. The pull of the EU encouraged dedicated seats to minorities in Montenegro and in Slovenia, though the latter does so only for its autochthonous minorities. Germany helped convince Croatia to reserve seats for minorities. Croatia also reserved seats for representatives chosen by the Croatian diaspora. Electoral engineers also added gender quotas for women in Macedonia, Bosnia, and Kosovo. Despite all the attention to crafting political institutions in Bosnia and Kosovo, these domestic institutions are so far overshadowed by international officials, whose powers in practice make them International Protectorates.

Elections and Political Parties

The countries of the former Yugoslavia have often been left out of the bulk of comparative literature on political competition in the postcommunist region. Yet, these countries share characteristics of their Central and East European neighbors, including weak party systems, a rather amorphous ideological spectrum, and party fragmentation. These countries are characterized by intensive international involvement in domestic politics, as well as by entrenched ethnic party systems. Valerie Bunce suggests that the victory of a liberal, anti-communist opposition in the first multi-party election permits a decisive break with the authoritarian past and a launching of a liberal program. In contrast, the victory of an ethnically exclusive opposition can obviate democratization and lead to challenges to state boundaries.³³ Communist parties can also adopt nationalist agendas in order to maintain their holds on power.

By these criteria, only Slovenia experienced a relatively smooth democratic transition and process of state formation in its first post-Yugoslav election, the founding parliamentary election. The non-communist coalition DEMOS won. The leader of the reformed communist party won the presidency. This new government enacted pluralist and market reforms and declared Slovenia's independence from Yugoslavia. After the movement-based DEMOS disintegrated, the fragmented party system consolidated into four strong parties: the left-oriented United List of Social Democrats, the moderate left Liberal Democracy of Slovenia, the center-right Slovenian Democratic Party, and the Christian Democratic Party. These four parties have consistently captured the bulk of the seats in the National Assembly. Broad agreement among Slovenia's elite that their future was tied to European and Euro-Atlantic institutions helped the country achieve early membership in the EU and NATO. In addition, the absence of substantial minorities allowed Slovenia's significant illiberal forces to remain relatively harmless during its march into Europe.³⁴

By contrast, the first post-Yugoslav elections in Croatia and Serbia opened the door to nationalist forces which succeeded in advancing narrow ethnic agendas and undermined democratization by wars in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina. The end of war provided a context in which opposition coalitions could overcome their own bickering to win elections in second transitions and begin reform programs that contributed to more normal political competition.

In Serbia, Milosevic weathered several waves of anti-regime demonstrations and intra-party conflict to remake the League of Communists Serbia into a nationalist authoritarian party with its own satellite, the United Yugoslav Left (JUL), headed by

Milosevic's wife, Mirjana Markovic. In the founding election in 1990, his Socialist Party of Serbia (SPS) ensured that it would dominate the Parliament. The SPS's program appealed to socialist conformists as well as to Serbs who had criticized Tito's "weakening of Serb interests" in Yugoslavia in the 1980s.³⁵ The party was strongest outside Belgrade and in the Serbian heartland. Milosevic used existing structures to retain power, acquire wealth, distribute patronage to his family and allies among his criminalized support structure,³⁶ and manage "Serb" territories outside Serbia. War and a monopoly over politics, effective propaganda through government directed media, and control of the security forces allowed Milosevic to demobilize political opposition and eliminate political alternatives.³⁷

With the end of the war over Kosovo, the SPS could no longer label oppositionists as traitors. Ordinary Serbs increasingly attributed their poverty to the SPS's bad government. Milosevic's supporters among the criminal class had become independent of his patronage. The leaders of the liberal opposition finally set aside personal antagonism to unite, and the youth organization Otpor (Resistance) effectively led civic mobilization. These forces overturned Milosevic's plans to rig the 2000 presidential elections and helped secure the victory of Vojislav Kostunica, who was supported by an 18 party opposition coalition, the Democratic Opposition of Serbia (DOS). The DOS coalition convincingly won the December 2000 parliamentary elections, selecting the Democratic Party's (DS) Zoran Djindjic as Prime Minister. However, differences between Kostunica and Djindjic over a bargaining strategy with the West on reform led to the disintegration of the coalition. Not long thereafter, war profiteers assassinated Djindjic in response to

his plans for reform of the security sector and prospects of closer cooperation with the war crimes tribunal in The Hague.

In the 2003 parliamentary elections, Voislav Seselj's extremist Serb Radical Party (SRS) gained popular support from the general resentment against demands for closer Serbian cooperation with The Hague, as well as from popular sacrifices connected to economic reform. However, pressure from the West led Kostunica to form a center-right coalition that did not give the SRS a formal role, but that relies on its tacit support.³⁸ Current policies, the popularity of extremist parties, and the narrow victory of the DS's Boris Tadic over the SRS candidate in the 2004 presidential election mean that the second transition and movement toward the EU is ongoing, but far from complete in Serbia. This is particularly clear in the Skupstina's quickly and non-transparently drafted constitution that was unanimously adopted in September 2006. This first post-communist constitution placed Kosovo as an integral part of Serbia in clear opposition to the desires of Albanians in Kosovo, who played no role in drafting or voting on it. A referendum on the new constitution at the end of October will be followed by elections before the end of 2006. These elections will likely replace Kostunica's government, which has struggled to balance demands within a broad coalition. Kostunica's liberal partners, G17 Plus, is pushing for the reforms needed to resume talks with the EU on a Stabilization and Association Agreement, while its powerful and populist supporters remain distrustful and resentful of EU pressure on Serbia.

In Croatia, the nationalist movement was led by the Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ) under the leadership of former Partisan General and political dissident Franjo Tudjman with substantial support from political emigrés. The HDZ won power in 1990

on the basis of its anti-communist expression of Croatian identity. It was viewed as the most serious alternative to the atheistic socialism of the ex-Communists or Party of Democratic Change (SDP, later called the Social Democratic Party).³⁹ A majoritarian electoral system turned the HDZ's 46 percent of the popular vote into 67.5 percent of the seats in parliament. The losing Coalition of National Accord, which was composed of former Communists and Liberals, fragmented and formed a series of smaller parties. A majority of Serb SDP members chose to leave the evolving Croatian SDP. Regional parties in Istria have demonstrated considerable staying power. The war began in 1990-91 with the refusal of the Serb Democratic Party (SDS) leadership to join the broad governing compact led by HDZ in 1990. This refusal strengthened exclusivist tendencies within the HDZ and reinforced its image as the most serious defender of Croatia against Serb aggressors. As long as Serbs occupied Croatian territory, Tudjman's HDZ was able to monopolize power in Croatia. It tolerated and supported moderate Serb groups in Croatia in an effort to demonstrate its political openness, but its real monopoly of power provided a context for corrupt practices among the HDZ political and administrative elite.

With the return of all Serb-held territory and changes in the electoral laws, the diverse opposition to the HDZ made significant electoral gains in a number of cities and regions on platforms of good governance and political change. After Tudjman's death in the run-up to elections in early 2000, a moderate six-party opposition coalition headed by the SDP won control of parliament on a campaign that included accession to the EU. Their governing program included cutting the purse strings of the hard-line HDZ in Bosnia and cooperation with the International War Crimes Tribunal. However, a governing coalition whose connecting bond lay mainly in beating the HDZ in power would not prove

authoritative itself. Its inability to improve economic performance and its cooperation with The Hague's efforts to capture Croatian generals for trial at The Hague led to their defeat in elections in 2004 by a more compact and reformed version of the HDZ. Following its loss of power in 2000, the HDZ splintered and adapted its own electoral appeal to pursue integration into the EU. The sincerity of its commitment to reform is now being tested by EU demands that it fully cooperate with the war crimes tribunal as a precondition for beginning accession talks.

Leaders in the tiny, multiethnic, and poor Yugoslav republics of Bosnia-Herzegovina and Macedonia sensed the impending danger that the disintegration of Yugoslavia could lead to the dissolution of their own republics and attempted to forge compromises among competing political forces in their areas to respond to the designs of their more powerful and covetous neighbors. Electoral rules, social structure, and anti-communist sentiment worked to establish ethnic party systems. Only the rejection of their compromise proposals in negotiations over Yugoslavia's future led Macedonian and Bosnian leaders to pursue independence. Both countries have lived through external interventions that drastically rewrote domestic political rules.

A 1990 court decision striking down Bosnia's ban on ethnic parties and an electoral rule that mandated that the results of the elections not deviate more than 15 percent from the ethnic distribution in the census led to the victory of ethnically based parties, the Muslim Party of Democratic Action (SDA), and the Bosnian branches of the HDZ and SDS in the founding elections. During the campaign, all three party leaders committed to protecting ethnic interests and to inter-ethnic cooperation.⁴⁰ Although twice jailed in socialist Yugoslavia (in 1946 and 1983) for Islamic activities, SDA leader and BiH

President Alija Izetbegovic opposed an ethnically based state in favor of a constitution that recognized Bosnia as a state of three constituent peoples and others. However, inter-party cooperation deteriorated over the formula for the ethnic distribution of positions within the government administration. A majority of Bosnian citizens supported the referendum on independence, although Serbs boycotted the vote just as they did in Croatia. Leaders in Serbia and Croatia egged on and armed their co-ethnic parties in Bosnia on the pretext that the republic was dominated by radical Muslims.

Ethnic cleansing, international intervention, and institutional engineering created a break with the Yugoslav tradition of “brotherhood and unity.” The Dayton Accords included an unwieldy constitution with ineffective state institutions dominated by the ethnically based SDA, HDZ and SDS in the name of institutionalizing power-sharing.⁴¹ Electoralism – or the idea that holding elections will jump start the democratic process – has actually heightened inter-ethnic tensions in Bosnia.⁴² Since ethnically based parties rarely win votes from other groups, party leaders have strong incentives to make radical appeals to insure greater turnout of their own group.⁴³ Nonetheless, nationalists won increasingly narrow victories until the 2000 elections when international officials convinced diverse social democratic forces to unite behind the Social Democratic Party-led “Coalition for Change.” The Coalition’s efforts at comprehensive reform failed due to internal bickering and to opposition from exclusivist groups, forged during the wars. In the Republika Srpska, the Party of Independent Social Democrats is a regionally based Serbian moderate party that has been willing to enter into meaningful dialogue with Bosniac and international officials. But international intervention has undermined political accountability in Bosnia. Just after Dayton, international officials did not act

against exclusivists who illegally strengthened ethnic partition; the subsequent use of “Bonn powers” undermines the authority of Bosnian officials elected under Dayton’s rules.⁴⁴ As noted above, the Bonn powers enable the international High Representative to override Bosnian institutions to pass legislation and remove domestic officials from office.⁴⁵

In Macedonia, nationalists and reformed communists (soon becoming the SDSM) split the vote during the founding elections. Although the nationalist Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization (later, VMRO-DPMNU) won the most parliamentary seats in 1990, its government fell in a vote of no confidence in 1991. The reformed communists then formed a four-party coalition government that included the Albanian party. The party’s leader, Vladimir Gligorov, was elected president by the parliament and served as a bridge between the communist past and pluralist future. The Coalition supported interethnic cooperation by including four Albanian cabinet ministers in the government.⁴⁶ Although no Macedonian government has been able to break decisively with the past, all coalition governments – including that led by VMRO-DMPME in 1998 – have been multiethnic.

External pressure has actually enhanced multiethnic cooperation in Macedonia as it has always ensured a European, US, or UN commitment to support some sort of power-sharing agreement. The fighting that took place in 2001 has not significantly increased Macedonia’s polarization. The Ohrid Agreement has provided Macedonians with strong incentives to form an inclusive government of national unity and adopt ethnic power-sharing arrangements in the constitution. In contrast to the outcome in Bosnia, Macedonia’s first election following the violence resulted in a multiethnic coalition

government led by SDSM and other parties most committed to the peace agreement. Members of various multiethnic coalitions have largely managed to work together to formulate policy. But Macedonia faces serious problems of organized crime, corruption and economic development that cannot be so nimbly resolved.

In sum, there is uneven progress in the development of party systems across former Yugoslavia. In Slovenia and Croatia, movement parties that won the founding elections have dissipated and given way to party systems that range from conservative to social democratic parties, with a set of parties in the middle. These systems seem to be on the way to institutionalizing themselves and providing a range of proven policy programs.

Bosnia-Herzegovina and Macedonia, on the other hand, have developed entrenched ethnic party systems that inhibit any other basis of political competition, although ethnically based Social-Democratic parties have enjoyed some electoral success and have demonstrated their willingness to negotiate constructively across ethnic lines. The absence of a comprehensive second transition in Serbia, Montenegro and Kosovo means that their political parties remain mired in basic status and constitutional dilemmas and have not moved into interest-driven politics. Enduring and meaningful regional parties as well as smaller liberal and green parties have appeared during these countries' difficult transitions. Although these minor parties have little hope of winning elections, they have facilitated the formation of coalitions that support democratic reform. The durability of these smaller parties might demonstrate that, in the proper circumstances, the post-Yugoslav party systems can resemble those of more settled political systems that lack the daily drama of crisis and war and their legacies.

It is often held that voluntary organizations produce social capital that will strengthen democratization in the successor states. However, the actual impact of such organizations depends on the type of social capital they build and the rootedness of the organizations in local society. Advocacy organizations that link citizens to policymakers can help hold political leaders accountable. Those groups that disperse authority horizontally, rather than concentrate authority, are best at cultivating the repeated interdependent interaction that builds interpersonal trust. Groups that look outward, beyond the interests of their own members toward benefiting the larger community are better at solving broader social problems than those that focus only inward. Finally those groups that link together people of different cultural backgrounds are better at helping integrate a diverse society than those that bring together and provide social support only to those of the same cultural background.⁴⁷

The developments described in this chapter leave little doubt that many civil society organizations in the region are mono-ethnic. The many voluntary associations that focus on strengthening bonds within single ethnic groups contributed to conflict in Yugoslavia's multiethnic republics. For example, it is difficult to see how many of the religious organizations that were revived in the late 1980s could provide a basis for reconciliation and moderation when many religious leaders directly participated in exclusivist nationalist appeals.⁴⁸ Some mono-ethnic local organizations, which were linked to nationalist parties, crowded out a range of moderate groups that opposed violence.⁴⁹ Other organizations are inward-looking, hierarchically structured, and willing to use violence to realize their exclusivist goals. These include paramilitary groups such as Arkan's Tigers and Seselj's Cetniks in Serbia.⁵⁰ The International War Crimes

Tribunal has indicted many leaders of such groups that display the “dark side” of social capital.

Some local, multi-ethnic organizations that grew out of the war produce social capital that bridges ethnic divisions: Medica Zenica, for example, is a voluntary organization formed by local women residents of all backgrounds in Zenica, Bosnia to aid female victims of the war.⁵¹ Other groups include displaced persons (DPs), veterans, and families of missing persons. Victims’ groups in Bosnia and Kosovo can adopt different strategies: either to return as minorities to their homes of origin or to rebuild new lives in areas where they are among the ethnic majority. Veterans associations, which are split along ethnic lines and are inward-looking, resent their marginalization in the post-conflict period and tend to support nationalist groups.⁵²

Western agencies have generously supported NGOs that produce “good” social capital that contributes to the democratization of postcommunist states, but overlook NGOs that emerge from local traditions of informal networks of mutual help rooted in everyday life, such as in the neighborhood and the workplace.⁵³ From their own experiences, donors have favored NGOs that have engaged in advocacy -- even where they have shallow roots in society -- and whose formation is driven largely by donors’ needs. It is encouraging that leaders of advocacy groups, such as legal aid and human rights groups, are making progress in forming networks to monitor and influence government. For example, Sarajevo’s Serb Civic Council [SCC] was established during the war by intellectuals to assist Serbs choosing to live in Bosnia’s Federation. After Dayton, the SCC successfully cooperated with Bosniac and Croat opposition intellectual groups to ensure that Serbs, Croats, and Bosniacs were all legally constituent nations

throughout Bosnia. Nationalist leaders have employed the conflict to discourage the formation of civic organizations that unite diverse peoples around common interests, and thus help keep inter-communal peace.⁵⁴ More often, efforts to improve interethnic relations have been mounted by mono-ethnic groups that are committed to interethnic cooperation.

The long-term character of building tolerant civil societies in Yugoslavia's successor states is clearer to local activists and some international implementers on the ground than to donor agencies that demand immediate results. A recent USAID study concluded that many NGOs in South Eastern Europe "still have tenuous links with their communities" because of their orientation toward international donors.⁵⁵ Ordinary citizens remain disaffected and often view local NGOs as promoters of Western agendas and sources of support for opportunistic leaders. To be sure, some domestic activists have made progress in strengthening organizations that embrace civility, responsiveness and democratic principles. However, the successor states' civil societies remain dominated by organizations that promote narrow, group interests rather than focusing on cross-cutting problems, such as social integration or the political accountability of the government. International donors also need to learn to work with domestic groups by adopting locally-determined agendas as key elements in empowering local communities.

Citizens and Politics

As in most postcommunist systems, the significant gap between elites and ordinary citizens that persists in most successor states results from a one-party system legacy, relatively weak party systems, and corruption. The willingness of citizens to participate in politics has varied according to timing, political context, and economic situation. Voter

turnout was high during the euphoria of the founding elections and then tapered off with the realization that the end of one-party rule would not increase political responsiveness. Citizens also quickly discerned the self-serving behavior of political elites working in the new political institutions. In all countries, voter turnout for parliamentary elections has declined since 1990. It slipped from 84.5 percent in 1990 to 61.6 percent in 2003 in Croatia; from 71.5 in 1990 to 58.7 in 2003 for Serbia; from 80 percent in 1990 to 55.4 percent in 2002 in Bosnia; and from 78 percent in 1990 to 73.5 percent in Macedonia in 2002.

Elections for the president of Serbia were invalidated three times when less than 50 percent of voters bothered to turn out in 2002 and 2003. Only amending the law led the elections to succeed. The heavy hand of the Office of the High Representative in Bosnia Herzegovina has further depressed citizens' reported efficacy. Of those who did not vote in the last elections, 43 percent explained that they stayed home on election day because "Bosnia and Herzegovina's politicians cannot change anything."⁵⁶ It appears that low levels of participation result from the general perception that parties do not offer meaningful political alternatives, are not responsive to citizens' concerns, or have little power.

It is interesting to note that levels of participation in a range of political activities in the former Yugoslav states are roughly the same as the modest level of political participation for the Central and East European region as a whole (Table I). Citizen mistrust of political organizations is widespread in postcommunist societies and also leads to low levels of membership in political parties. **(Table 1 here)**

During wartime, exclusivist leaders succeeded in deflecting the effect of citizen-initiated protests that had become common in the late 1980s through 1991 in Slovenia, Croatia, and Serbia. We saw above that Milosevic employed demonstrations of unemployed and embittered Serbs to change regional leaderships. Large non-violent demonstrations – for political reform in Belgrade in 1991 and peace in Sarajevo in 1992 – were met with violence by the JNA and SDS snipers, respectively. The Tudjman and Milosevic governments easily deflected anti-war protests by committed activists – often women – and could enlist rural-based and nationalist victims groups in support of national goals. But from the mid 1990s onward, anti-authoritarian protests in Zagreb and Belgrade grew larger and bolder. An estimated 100,000 people protested their leaders' attempts to silence popular opposition radio stations, for example.⁵⁷ Most significantly, *Otpor* [*Resistance*] took advantage of low-key US aid and a weakened SPS to mobilize citizens successfully against Milosevic in Fall 2000. A relatively high percentage of respondents in Serbia reported participating in such demonstrations (Table I). In Bosnia and post-Milosevic Serbia, citizens are more willing to engage in protests if they involve economic rather than political issues.⁵⁸ This preference reflects the priority citizens in all of the former Yugoslav states give to economic concerns, as well as the continuing poor performance of the economies in the region.⁵⁹

It is not unusual for protests to become violent. Nationalist protests continue to take place in Kosovo and Bosnia, sometimes with the assistance of ruling parties and the tacit support of local police. Developments that threaten entrenched nationalist leaders can lead to violent protests – against returning refugees and internally displaced people, the normalization of relations in divided communities of Mostar (Bosnia) or Mitrovica

(Kosovo), campaign rallies by minorities, or in response to rumors of interethnic crime. Two days of cross-Kosovo violence in March 2004 that saw Albanian extremists attack Serbs, Roma, and UN and NATO forces were the most significant of these. It is also not unusual for intra-ethnic political competition to become violent in Serbia, Kosovo, or Bosnia, especially over control of power and wealth that flows from the black market.

Political Values and Attitudes toward Politics

Mainstream political scientists hold that the political culture of the nations of the former Yugoslavia tends to be a “subject” political culture in which citizens sit back and expect the government to provide for them.⁶⁰ But it is just as easy to argue that citizens are rationally disaffected with a political system whose parties present them with few meaningful choices, especially when patronage networks do not deliver benefits to ordinary citizens. In deeply divided societies with ethnic party systems, citizens tend to vote for parties that represent ethnically defined interests. But ordinary citizens also avoid involvement in politics because it is considered dirty. Some citizens also believe that political parties contribute to ethnic tension.⁶¹

Surveys indicate that citizens of most of successor countries lack confidence in their political institutions **(insert Table 2 here)**. The low level of confidence in domestic political institutions runs against the general aspiration for a democratic political system. The percentage of respondents who agree that: “though democracy has its problems, it is the best political system” ranges from a high of 96 percent in Croatia to a low of 81 percent of respondents in Macedonia.⁶² These findings are consistent with opinions across postcommunist Europe. When asked to identify elements of democracy they consider extremely important, citizens from Serbia, Vojvodina, Kosovo, Croatia, Bosnia,

and Macedonia all ranked “a justice system treating everybody equally,” “economic prosperity in the country,” and “a government that guarantees meeting the basic economic needs of all the citizens” as their top three associations with democracy.⁶³ These priority associations reflect concern over the arbitrary rule, absence of prosperity and the prevalence of corruption during the periods of socialism and the wars of succession. They also display an enduring preference for the state to provide for basic needs. The exclusion of political elements of democracy, such as civil liberties and political pluralism, is consistent with the views of citizens in Romania and Bulgaria.⁶⁴ The percentage of respondents satisfied with the way democracy is developing in their country ranged from a high of 45 percent in Slovenia and Serbia to a low of 18 percent in Croatia and Macedonia.⁶⁵ This result may reflect citizens’ interpretations of their country’s economic performance: citizens throughout the successor states identify unemployment as the most important problem facing their countries.⁶⁶ Poverty and corruption vie for second place.

Citizens express moderate levels of tolerance for other ethnic groups. As expected in areas that are experiencing interethnic brutality, levels of tolerance towards other ethnic groups worsened during and in the immediate wake of violence. In Croatia, individuals who experienced a personal tragedy expressed lower levels of ethnic tolerance than those who did not.⁶⁷ But this pattern varies. Although Bosnia experienced much higher levels of violence than Macedonia, Bosnian citizens express higher levels of tolerance than do Macedonian citizens. In 2001, 11 percent of a Bosnian sample expressed unwillingness to live next to someone of another religion. Twenty-six percent of a Macedonian sample expressed a similar unwillingness.⁶⁸ As war’s memory recedes, ethnic tolerance in Bosnia

has significantly increased, which suggests that interethnic relations have made greater progress at the grassroots than at the elite level.⁶⁹ We find the lowest levels of ethnic tolerance—including coexistence in the same entity—in Kosovo.⁷⁰

In response to policies primarily formulated by a dominant national group, ethnic minorities express significantly less pride in the nationality of their state and trust in political institutions than do members of the predominant group. For example, 92 percent of majority-group respondents in Bosnia express pride in their nationality, while only 56 percent of minority respondents in Bosnia express such pride. The corresponding figures in Macedonia are 90 percent and 42 percent.⁷¹

The extent to which political values vary according socio-economic status depends partly on the political environment. For example, in the immediate wake of Milosevic's ouster, voters in Serbia with some university education overwhelmingly (65 percent) supported the DOS opposition coalition, while only 5 percent supported SPS in 2001.⁷² With the breakup of DOS, the difficult economic transition, and disputes with the EU over war crimes and Kosovo, there appeared no strong correlation between values and socioeconomic status by 2004.⁷³ However, generational differences over values are still reported. Relatively liberal young Bosnians have abstained from voting in larger percentages than older age cohorts.⁷⁴ Surveys also reveal that urbanites resent the rural residents who have fled from their villages to cities because of violence and poverty – even within the same ethno-national group.⁷⁵

The transformation of values to those that support democratic principles and processes is necessary for democratic institutions to take root and to prevent a reversion to authoritarianism. In particular, tolerance towards other ethnic groups is essential for

transition towards more normal political competition and stable states that promote regional stability. The good news is that citizens express levels of confidence in new political institutions and values that are largely consistent with the rest of westward-leaning Central and Eastern Europe. They are broadly supportive of democratic ideas but lack confidence in new political institutions that have often failed to deliver benefits to ordinary citizens.

Economic Transition and Social Change

The wars of the 1990s significantly complicated the already challenging transformation of the mixed economies of the Yugoslav successor states. Wars in Croatia and Bosnia in the early 1990s and in Serbia and Kosovo at the end of the 1990s created a series of pariah economies that have been unable to attract substantial foreign investment. The economies suffered physical destruction of infrastructure and productive capacity, as well as the emigration of young, highly educated and skilled labor. Serbia suffered under sanctions throughout the decades for its support of the Serb war effort in Bosnia. Macedonia suffered from a Greek boycott of its economy in the early 1990s and from the cutoff of Yugoslav markets that had been easily available before 1990.

Even Slovenia, whose EU accession process accelerated its market reforms and whose per capita Gross National Income rivals that of Greece, has privatized the banking sector slowly. As the table below indicates, the war dramatically slowed the economic development of all successor states, particularly in the first half of the 1990s. In a period of increasing unemployment, these economies uniformly experienced great inflation and decreasing production and GDP. These trends have been particularly significant in Kosovo where unemployment is as high as 60 to 70 percent.⁷⁶ **(insert Table 3 here)**

The wars also significantly curtailed already decreasing inter-republican trade. Those countries with more advanced economies – Slovenia and Croatia-- were able to capitalize relatively quickly on their advantageous status by better integrating into the European and global economy than were the less well-developed republics. For Serbia and Montenegro, Bosnia, and Macedonia, trade tends to be split among the former Yugoslav successors and the EU. Deepened political commitment to integration with the EU has accelerated economic reform and improved economic performance—albeit to varying degrees—of those countries still seeking entry into the EU.

The war in Bosnia, Croatia and Kosovo provided fertile soil for the development of gray economies and corruption – especially the golden goose of international reconstruction aid. Corruption significantly hampers economic development and democratization in all successor states but Slovenia. In terms of Freedom House's measure of corruption from 1 (least corrupt) to 7 (most corrupt), Slovenia garners a score of 2, Bosnia and Croatia hover around 4.5, and Serbia, Montenegro and Macedonia all score around 5.⁷⁷ Only the Central Asian states and Belarus score worse. Leadership circles around Serbian President Milosevic and Croatian President Tudjman were especially prone to personalizing the public trust, but this phenomenon was also evident elsewhere.⁷⁸ Estimates of the size of Bosnia's grey economy range from 30 to 40 percent of unadjusted, official GDP.⁷⁹ Control over the grey market has also enabled the leading nationalist parties in Bosnia to maintain power and undermine implementation of the Dayton Accords. Attempts to prosecute war profiteers in Serbia cost Zoran Djindjic his life. Criminal networks among Macedonia's Albanians contributed to armed violence in

2001.⁸⁰ These phenomena are linked to transnational trafficking networks in people and commodities that will not be easily eradicated.

The war significantly slowed economic reform and the privatization of property. The social implications of war are no less severe. A higher percentage of women than men are unemployed. Young adults are unemployed at higher levels than are other cohorts. This fact leads young and educated labor to emigrate, a brain drain that affects future economic development. In Kosovo, Bosnia, and Croatia, minorities' unemployment is higher than that of majorities. Widespread poverty in Bosnia, Serbia and Montenegro has led to social atomization and political demobilization.⁸¹ These economies continue to wait to embark on the process of reform and modernization.

International agencies have attempted to address these problems as part of larger peace accords. They have donated over \$5 billion to the Bosnian economy after the signing of the Dayton Accords, and donors' conferences have generated substantial amounts of income for Croatia and Kosovo. While this aid has contributed significantly to the repair and reconstruction of housing and infrastructure, it has been unevenly distributed and kept away from those groups – especially in Republia Srpska and among the Serb community in Kosovo – who have not explicitly supported the implementation of the peace accords. A great deal of effort remains to provide a proper legal framework for the economic transition that will enable these countries to benefit from trade and foreign investment. It will be no easy task for international agencies to find an effective balance among goals of recovery, reconstruction, and reform.

Critical Issues

There is no shortage of critical issues facing governments in Yugoslavia's successor states as they look towards accession to the EU. If Slovenia has largely succeeded in leaving the Balkans for Central Europe and EU membership, the other governments face stiffer hurdles to "normalcy." The Croatian government's increased cooperation with the International War Crimes Tribunal's demands to hand over indicted war criminals has been generally taken as a sign of its desire for accession to European institutions. It must also continue to convince its European partners that it has taken all necessary steps to provide for the return of Serb refugees. Croatian policy makers appear to be addressing serious issues in economic reform and improving the rule of law in a political system that is increasingly flexible and whose parties increasingly share consensus on some basic values and norms of behavior. The trends are a source of hope for its future in Europe and at home.

An underlying consensus across factions seems more illusive in the region's other governments, which must still move beyond the war's zero-sum politics. To different degrees, these governments must establish security and the rule of law, find a way to resolve inter-ethnic tensions, find durable solutions for a good many internally displaced persons and refugees, eradicate public corruption and organized crime, undertake economic reform, and expand employment.

In many places, political leaders and nongovernmental organizations must still resolve the basic issues of political status and the constitutional order. The successful implementation of the Ohrid Accords will go a long way toward creating a functioning political system in Macedonia that can join the community of southeast European countries. The resolution of Kosovo's status would end the uncertainties that provide

fertile soil for continuing violence and the absence of reform. Compelling efforts to integrate Republika Srpska into Bosnia will allow Bosnians from all groups to move into a more hopeful future. The narrow victory for Montenegrin independence on 21 May 2006 and Belgrade's willingness to recognize the newly independent state has put to rest the tensions between Serbia and Montenegro and could provide the basis for the emergence of normal politics in Montenegro. These successes would help to lower costs of external deployments in this impending "hour of Europe" in the Balkans.

The Serbian government continues to exercise influence over many of the region's dilemmas. No government has more to gain from a constructive approach to these dilemmas than does Serbia's – a government whose finest traditions were high-jacked in the interest of obscurantist nationalist goals that looked to a distant, mythical past rather than to a future of progress and prosperity. This assessment does not relieve political leaders throughout the other successor states from their own responsibilities to contribute constructively to end the fractious fighting. Finally, no solution to these constitutional problems will be found without constructive assistance from the international community, the same community that neither acted to preserve Yugoslavia nor intervened to end aggression. International agencies have been deeply involved in developments in Yugoslavia since 1991 and have overseen the often flawed implementation of peace accords throughout. Their greatest test will be in how adroitly they assist governments in the successor states in managing the transition from war to peace.

Suggested Readings

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Table I: modes of political participation

	% have joined an unofficial strike	% belong to a political party	% have attended a lawful demonstration	% have signed a petition
Slovenia	3.0	32.4	9.8	3.7
Serbia	7.5	5.8	24.0	32.4
Croatia	3.2	5.0	7.8	37.4
Bosnia	3.6	7.1	3.6	22.0
Macedonia	5.0	11.7	17.8	26.6
East European region⁸²	4.7	6.0	15.5	31.8

Source: European Values Study Group and World Values Survey Association 2004.

N for Slovenia =1006; N for Serbia (minus Kosovo) = 1,200; N for Croatia=1,003; N for Bosnia = 1,200; N for Macedonia=1,055; N for East European region = 14,004. For each question, “don’t knows” were deleted from the sample, resulting in slightly smaller Ns.

Table II: Low levels of confidence in political institutions (2001)⁸³

	% trusting political parties	% trusting parliament	% trusting church	% trusting police	% trusting army
Slovenia	19	25.3	35.4	47.4	41.6
Serbia	31.3	23.4	52.9	47.4	74.2
Croatia	N.A.	20.7	61.6	46.4	62.2
Bosnia	14.6	20.2	49.7	63.6	60.7
Macedonia⁸⁴	9.5	7.0	46.1	51.0	54.5
East European region	15.9	24.2	49.9	46.6	57.2
2003 EU members	15.0	35.0	42.0	64.0	64.0

(Pickering and Baskin)

Source for data on Eastern Europe: European Values Study Group and World Values Survey Association 2004.

Source for 2003 EU members: *Eurobarometer 60: Public Opinion in the European Union*, (Brussels: European Opinion Research Group, 2003),

http://europa.eu.int/comm/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb60/eb60_en.pdf.

Table IV: Increasing divergent economies in 2003

	GNI per capita 2003 (current US\$)	GDP growth 2003 (annual %)	FDI, net inflows, 2003 (current US\$)	Trade in goods as share of 2003 GDP (%) & major export partner (2002)	Unemployment (2002 as % of labor force)
Slovenia	11,920	2.5%	337.0 mil	95.9% Germany -23.1%	6.1%
Croatia	5,370	4.3%	1.1 bil	70.5% Italy -26.4%	14.4%
Serbia & Montenegro	1,910	3.0%	1.4 bil	48.5% Bosnia-15.8%	13.8%
Macedonia	1,980	3.2%	94.6 mil	77.0% Serbia- 22.1%	31.9%
Bosnia	1,530	2.7%	381.0 mil	83.7% Croatia 17.1%	41.1%

Sources: World Bank for GNI per capita; GDP growth; FDI; and trade in goods as a share of GDP;

<http://www.worldbank.org/data/countrydata/countrydata.html>.

Index of Economic Freedom for major export partner, Heritage

<http://www.heritage.org/research/features/index/countries.cfm>

European Union for Unemployment in all but Slovenia: http://www.europa.eu.int/pol/enlarg/index_en.htm;

EURO Stat for unemployment in Slovenia,

http://epp.eurostat.cec.eu.int/portal/page?_pageid=1996,45323734&_dad=portal&_schema=PORTAL&screen=welcomeref&open=/&product=STRIND_EMPLOI&depth=2

Endnotes

¹To get a sense of differences, see essays by Sabrina Ramet, “Anti-bibliography: Reviewing the Reviews,” in *Balkan Babel*, ed. Sabrina Ramet (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2002), 391-404; Gale Stokes, John Lampe, Dennison Rusinow and Julie Mostov, “Instant History – Understanding the Wars of Yugoslav Succession,” *Slavic Review* 55, no. 1 (1996): 136-160; and Sarah Kent, “Writing the Yugoslav Wars,” *American Historical Review* 102, no. 4 (1997): 1085-1114; and Ivo Banac, “Historiography of the Countries of Eastern Europe: Yugoslavia,” *American Historical Review* 97, no. 4 (1992): 1084-1102.

²William Zimmerman, *Open Borders, Non-Alignment and the Political Evolution of Yugoslavia* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986).

³ It is impossible to do justice to the diverse cultural, social, economic and political background of the lands of the former Yugoslavia. For general background, see Ivo Banac, *The Yugoslav National Question* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1984); Barbara Jelavich, *History of the Balkans* 2 volumes (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1983); Charles Jelavich and Barbara Jelavich, *The Establishment of the Balkan National States, 1804-1920* (Seattle and London: University of Washington Press, 1977) and Joseph Rothchild, *East Central Europe between the Two World Wars* (Seattle and London: University of Washington Press, 1974); Jozo Tomasevich, *Peasants, Politics and Economic Change* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1955), John Lampe, *Yugoslavia as History: Twice There was a Country* 2nd Edition (Cambridge: Cambridge

University Press, 2000); and Mark Mazower, *The Balkans, A Short History* (New York: Random House, 2002).

⁴ Banac, p. 415-416.

⁵ Dennison Rusinow, *The Yugoslav Experiment, 1948-1974* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978).

⁶ See Ivo Banac, *With Stalin Against Tito: Cominform Splits in Yugoslav Communism* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1988).

⁷ See Zimmerman and Alvin Z. Rubinstein, *Yugoslavia and the Nonaligned World* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1970).

⁸ Zimmerman nicely makes this argument. Also see Susan Woodward, *Socialist Unemployment: The Political Economy of Yugoslavia, 1945-1990* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995).

⁹ Woodward, *Socialist Unemployment*; John Lampe, *Yugoslavia as History: Twice There was a Country* 2nd Edition (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000).

¹⁰ Woodward, *Socialist Unemployment*, 384.

¹¹ The term Bosniac is used to describe the Slavic Moslems who live mainly in Bosnia-Herzegovina, but also in Serbia, Montenegro and Kosovo. They had been known as Muslims in a national sense since 1971, but the Congress of Bosniac Intellectuals officially adopted the term "Bosniac" as the name for the people in 1993 and it has been generally accepted among all Slavic Muslims. See Mustafa Imamovic, *Istorija Bosnjaka* (Sarajevo, 1998) and Ivo Banac, *The Yugoslav National Question* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1984).

¹² Kosovo became an “Autonomous Province” in 1974 enjoying almost all of the perquisites of republican status, but with fewer representatives on the state presidency and without the formal right to secede. It had earlier been an “Autonomous Region” within Serbia. See Mark Baskin, “Crisis in Kosovo,” *Problems of Communism* 32, no. 2 (March-April 1983): 61-74.

¹³ Arend Lijphart, *Democracy in Plural Societies* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1980); Paul Shoup, *Yugoslav Communism and the National Question* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1968); Pedro Ramet, *Nationalism and Federalism in Yugoslavia, 1963-1983* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1984); and Steven Burg, *Conflict and Cohesion in Socialist Yugoslavia: Political Decision Making Since 1966* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983).

¹⁴ Burg, *Conflict and Cohesion*. p. 346.

¹⁵ Lenard J. Cohen, *Serpent and Bosom: The Rise and Fall of Slobodan Milosevic* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2001).

¹⁶ Lenard J. Cohen, *Broken Bonds: Yugoslavia's Disintegration and Balkan Politics in Transition*, 2nd Edition, (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1995), 47.

¹⁷ Lampe, *Yugoslavia as History*, 354-355; Ramet, *Balkan Babel*, 54-55.

¹⁸ Jacque Poos, foreign minister of Luxembourg, during Luxembourg's presidency of the European Community Council of Ministers, in 1991, famously declared that “this is the hour of Europe” during his shuttle diplomacy between Belgrade, Zagreb and Ljubljana and Brioni. See *Unfinished Peace: Report of the International Commission on the Balkans* (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1996), p.

56, and Dan Smith, "Europe's Peacebuilding Hour? Past Failures, Future Challenges," 55 (Spring, 2002), p. 442.

¹⁹ See the estimates at the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees' Balkan web site: <http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/balkans?page=maps>.

²⁰ Lampe, *Yugoslavia as History*, p. 370.

²¹ See <http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/co_mission/unprof_p.htm> for basic information on UNPROFOR.

²² An estimated 900 Serbs were killed in the Croatian offensive against Serb-held Krajina in 1995 (Amnesty International 1998).

²³ Quoted in Branka Magas, "Franjo Tudjman, an Obituary," *The Independent* 13 December 1999.

²⁴ Ethnic cleansing is a campaign in which authorities, acting according to a premeditated plan, capture or consolidate control over territory by forcibly displacing or killing members of opposing ethnic groups (Human Rights Watch/Helsinki 1996, p. 6)

²⁵ For example, the HVO destroyed the beautiful 16th century bridge that united east and west Mostar, and, Serb forces destroyed the Ferhadija Mosque in Banja Luka, the largest in Europe, among the many objects.

²⁶ The Bonn meeting of the Peace Implementation Council in December 1997 concluded that the "High Representative can facilitate the resolution of difficulties by making binding decisions on...interim measures to take effect when the parties are unable to reach agreement....[and] actions against...officials...found by the HR to be in violation of legal commitments under the peace agreement...." See web site for the

Office of the High Representative:

<http://www.ohr.int/pic/default.asp?content_id=5182#11>.

²⁷ See, for example, Tim Judah, *Kosovo: War and Revenge* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2000).

²⁸ See, for example: Mark Baskin, *Developing Local Democracy in Kosovo* (Stockholm: IDEA, 2005). Available at <http://www.idea.int/publications/dem_kosovo/index.cfm>, and *Kosovo Report* (London: Conflict Security & Development Group, 2003). Available at <<http://ipi.sspp.kcl.ac.uk/rep005/index.html>>.

²⁹ See, for example, Banac, *The Yugoslav National Question*, p. 307-328.

³⁰ Republika Makedonija Drzavni zavod za statistika, *Popis 2002* (Skopje: 1 December 2003). Available at <<http://www.stat.gov.mk/pdf/10-2003/2.1.3.30.pdf>>.

³¹ See, for example, International Crisis Group, “Macedonia: Not Out of the Woods Yet,” (25 February 2005). Available at <<http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=3295&l=1>>.

³² Mary Kaldor, *New and Old Wars: Organized Violence in a Global Era* (Palo Alto: Stanford University Press, 1999).

³³ Valerie Bunce, “The Political Economy of Postsocialism,” *Slavic Review* 58 (Winter 1999): 756-793. See also, Vernon Bogdanov, “Founding Elections and Regime Change,” *Electoral Studies* 1 (1990): 288-94, and Valerie Bunce, “Rethinking Recent Democratization: Lessons from the Postcommunist Experience,” *World Politics* 55 (January 2003): 189.

³⁴ Sabrina Petra Ramet, "Democratization in Slovenia – the Second Stage," in *Politics, Power, and the Struggle for Democracy in South-East Europe*, ed. Karen Dawisha and Bruce Parrott (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 189-217; Patrick Hyder Patterson, "On the Edge of Reason: The Boundaries of Balkanism in Slovenian, Austrian, and Italian Discourse," *Slavic Review* 62, no. 1 (Spring 2003): 110-141.

³⁵ Eric Gordy, *The Culture of Power in Serbia* (University Park: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1999).

³⁶ V.P. Gagnon, *The Myth of Ethnic War: Serbia and Croatia in the 1990* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2004), 92.

³⁷ Gagnon, *The Myth of Ethnic War*; Gordy, *The Culture of Power*.

³⁸ Vladimir Matic, *Serbia at the Crossroads Again* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Institute of Peace, 2004).

³⁹ Ivan Siber, "The Impact of Nationalism, Values, and Ideological Orientations on Multi-Party Elections in Croatia," in Jim Seroka and Vukasin Pavlovic, eds., *The Tragedy of Yugoslavia: The Failure of Democratic Transformation* (Armonk: M.E. Sharpe, 1992): 141-171; Kasapovic, *Hrvatska politika*; and Gagnon, *The Myth*.

⁴⁰ *The 1990 Elections in the Republics of Yugoslavia*, (Washington, DC: International Republican Institute for International Affairs, 1991); Suad Arnautovic, *Izbori u Bosni i Hercegovini 1990* (Sarajevo: Promocult, 1996).

⁴¹ European Commission for Democracy Through Law, "Opinion on the Constitutional Situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Powers of the High Representative" (March 2005). Available at

<http://www.venice.coe.int/SITE/DYNAMICS/N_RECENT_EF.ASP?L=E&TITLE1=62ND%20PLENARY%20SESSION&TITLE2=62E%20SESSION%20PLÉNIÈRE>.

⁴² Sumantra Bose, *Bosnia after Dayton: Nationalist Partition and International Intervention* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 117.

⁴³ Horowitz, *Ethnic Groups in Conflict* and Paul Mitchell, "Party competition in an Ethnic Dual Party System" *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 18 (October 1995).

⁴⁴ Elizabeth Cousens, "Missed Opportunities to Overcompensation: Implementing the Dayton Agreement on Bosnia," in *Ending Civil Wars: the Implementation of Peace Agreements*, ed. Stephen Stedman, Donald Rothchild, and Elizabeth M. Cousens (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2002): 531-66.

⁴⁵ See web site for the Office of the High Representative:
<http://www.ohr.int/pic/default.asp?content_id=5182#11>.

⁴⁶ Duncan Perry, "The Republic of Macedonia: Finding its Way," in *Politics, Power, and the Struggle for Democracy in South-East Europe*, ed. Karen Dawisha and Bruce Parrott (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997): 235.

⁴⁷ Robert D. Putnam, ed., *Democracies in Flux: The Evolution of Social Capital in Contemporary Society* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002).

⁴⁸ Leonard Cohen, "Prelates and Politicians in Bosnia: The Role of Religion in Nationalist Mobilisation" *Nationalities Papers* 25 (September 1997): 481-499.

⁴⁹ Anthony Oberschall, "The Manipulation of Ethnicity: From Ethnic Cooperation to Violence and War in Yugoslavia" *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 23, no. 6 (2000): 994-5;
Poggi *Bosnia and Herzegovina*, 83.

⁵⁰ Other groups: the HOS in Croatia; Muslim gangs that operated in Sarajevo in 1992; the Kosovo Liberation Army in Kosovo; and the Albanian National Liberation Army and Macedonian Lions in Macedonia have elements that are similar.

⁵¹ Cynthia Cockburn, *The Space Between Us: Negotiating Gender and National Identities in Conflict* (London: Zed Books, 1998).

⁵² Poggi, *Bosnia and Herzegovina*, 83. Bose, *Bosnia after Dayton*, 127.

⁵³ On NGOs, see Paul Stubbs, *Displaced Promises: Forced migration, Refuge and Return in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina* (Uppsala, Sweden: Life and Peace Institute, 1999). On good neighborly relations, see Tone Bringa, *Being Muslim the Bosnian Way* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995). On work, see Paula M. Pickering, "Generating Social Capital For Bridging Ethnic Divisions In The Balkans," *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 29, no. 1 (2006); David Chandler, *Faking Democracy after Dayton* (London: Pluto Press, 2000); Sevima Sali-Terzic, "Civil Society" in *Policies of International Support to South-Eastern European Countries: Lessons (not) Learnt from Bosnia and Herzegovina*, ed. Zarko Papic (Sarajevo: Open Society Institute, 2001): 138-59.

⁵⁴ Ashutosh Varshney *Ethnic Conflict and Civic Life: Hindus and Muslims in India* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2001).

⁵⁵ Jennifer Stuart, ed. *The 2002 NGO Sustainability Index* (Washington, DC: US Agency for International Development, 2003).

⁵⁶ UN Development Programme, *Early Warning System in Bosnia-Herzegovina*, IV (2004, 52), <<http://www.undp.ba/index.aspx?PID=14>> (30 Oct. 2005).

⁵⁷ Leonard J. Cohen, “Embattled democracy: post-communist Croatia in transition,” in *Politics, Power, and the Struggle for Democracy in South-East Europe*, ed. Karen Dawisha and Bruce Parrott (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 112.

⁵⁸ UN Development Programme, *Early Warning System in Bosnia-Herzegovina*, 70; UN Development Programme, *Early Warning System Report, FYR Macedonia*, (November 2004, 20), <<http://www.undp.org.mk/default.asp?where=publications>> (30 Oct. 2005).

⁵⁹ Kasapovic, ed., *Hrvatska politika*, 301, 336; Institute for Democracy and Electoral Analysis, “Survey Results: South Eastern Europe: New Means for Regional Analysis,” (2002). Available at <http://archive.idea.int/balkans/survey_detailed.cfm>.

⁶⁰ Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba, *The Civic Culture* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1978).

⁶¹ UN Development Programme, *Early Warning System in Bosnia-Herzegovina*, 70; UN Development Programme, *Early Warning System Report, FYR Macedonia*, 30.

⁶² European Values Study Group and World Values Survey Association, *European and World Values Surveys Integrated Data File, 1999-2002, Release 1* [Computer file]. 2nd ICPSR version, 2004.

⁶³ Institute for Democracy and Electoral Analysis, “Survey Results: South Eastern Europe: New Means for Regional Analysis,” (2002). Available at <http://archive.idea.int/balkans/survey_detailed.cfm>. The total survey sample, which includes Romania and Bulgaria, is 10,000.

⁶⁴ Institute for Democracy and Electoral Analysis, “Survey Results.” The other options for elements that are extremely important to have in a society in order to call it a

democratic society include: “at least two strong political parties competing in elections; a government that guarantees economic equality of its citizens; the freedom to criticize the government; and equal representation of men and women in elected positions.”

⁶⁵ European Values Study Group and World Values Survey Association, *European*.

⁶⁶ Institute for Democracy and Electoral Analysis, “Survey Results.” Numerous other students corroborate these concerns, including Kasapovic, *Hrvatska politika*, IRI, NDI.

⁶⁷ Robert M. Kunovich and Randy Hodson, “Conflict, Religious Identity, and Ethnic Intolerance in Croatia,” *Social Forces* 78 (December 1999): 643-74.

⁶⁸ European Values Study Group and World Values Survey Association, *European*. Surveys during the socialist period revealed greater levels of inter-ethnic tolerance in Bosnia than in Macedonia. See, Bačević, Bjiļjana, Stefica Bahtijarevic, Vladimir Goati, Goran Miles, Milan Miljevic, Dimitar Mircev, Dragomir Pantic, Nikola Paplasen, Niko Tos, and Marjana Vasovic, eds. 1991. *Jugoslavia na kriznoj prekretnici* (Beograd: Institut Drustvenih Nauka, 1991. Despite low levels of inter-ethnic tolerance, groups in Macedonia are more resigned to coexisting in the same state than are groups in Bosnia.

⁶⁹ Paula M. Pickering, “Swimming Upstream: Grassroots perspectives in Bosnia on progress in interethnic relations since Dayton,” (paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies, Boston, Mass, December 2004).

⁷⁰ *The Balkans in Europe’s Future*, (Sofia: International Commission on the Balkans, 2005): Annex

⁷¹ European Values Study Group and World Values Survey Association, *European*.

⁷² European Values Study Group and World Values Survey Association, *European*.

⁷³ Matic, *Serbia at the Crossroads*, 17.

⁷⁴ OSCE Democratization Department, *Public Opinion Research* (Sarajevo: OSCE mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina, May 2004)
<<http://www.oscebih.org/documents/741-eng.pdf>>.

⁷⁵ Anis Dani, Forster, Mirsada Muzur, Dino Dijipa, Paula Lytle, and Patrizia Poggi, "A Social Assessment of Bosnia and Hercegovina," (Washington D.C.: The World Bank, Europe and Central Asia Region, Environmentally and Socially Sustainable Development Unit, ECSSD, April 1999).

⁷⁶ *The Balkans in Europe's Future*, 20.

⁷⁷ Freedom House, *Nations in Transit 2005*
<<http://www.freedomhouse.org/research/nattransit.htm>>. The corruption score includes measure of government implementation of anti-corruption measures, laws, and public perceptions.

⁷⁸ Gagnon, *The Myth of Ethnic War* and Cohen, *Serpent and Bosom*, 90.

⁷⁹ "Bosnia-Herzegovina: Selected Economic Issues," IMF Country Report 5/198 (International Monetary Fund June 2005).

⁸⁰ Robert Hislope, "Organized Crime in a Disorganized State: How Corruption Contributed to Macedonia's Mini-War" *Problems of Post-Communism*, 49 (May/June 2002).

⁸¹ Poggi et al, *Bosnia and Herzegovina*, Appendix; Gordy, *The Culture of Power*, ch. 5.

⁸² The "East European region" includes all countries of the former Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania and Slovakia. Albania was not included in the survey.

⁸³ For the countries of the former Yugoslavia and the East European region, the table shows the percentage of respondents who expressed a “great deal” or “quite a lot” of confidence in particular institutions. For the 2003 EU members, the table shows the percentage of respondents who “tend to trust” particular institutions.

⁸⁴ The degree of disaffection reflected by Macedonian citizens reflects the fact that Macedonia had just experienced months of inter-ethnic violence when the survey was conducted in 2001. Many citizens expressed deep disgruntlement that their politicians and political institutions were incapable of prevent such violence.