

Explaining Support for Non-nationalist Parties
In Post-conflict Societies in the Balkans¹

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Across the globe, states that are deeply divided have embarked on the already arduous process of democratization. In such contexts, voter support for non-nationalist parties willing to engage in cross-ethnic² cooperation is particularly crucial for the success of democratization, the prevention of communal violence, and regional stability. I conceive of non-nationalist parties as parties that, even if they are rooted in a particular ethnic group, portray ethnic relations as not inherently hostile and downplay ethnicity relative to their competitors during election campaigns. I investigate voters of the two similar countries of Bosnia and Macedonia, which are small, impoverished, ethnically fragmented, and threatened states that arose out of Yugoslavia.³ Why, despite these similarities, did voters choose parties for their national parliaments that espoused divergent positions on interethnic relations in the first elections after violence—in 1996 in Bosnia and in 2002 in Macedonia?

While I investigate the interplay of multiple factors theorized to influence elections outcomes, I focus in this paper on assessing the influence of grassroots factors. Analysis uncovers several factors that combine to benefit Macedonia's non-nationalist challengers, which were led by the communist successor party. Macedonian supporters of non-nationalists expressed both strong positive associations with the past communist system and clear negative assessments of the governing record of the incumbent nationalists, sentiments that did not exist among Bosniaks.

Explaining this puzzle of voter support for non-nationalist parties in deeply divided states, like those in Bosnia and Macedonia, addresses key concerns in comparative politics. First, this paper examines voting in two deeply divided societies in South Eastern Europe that have produced domestic and regional violence and remain vulnerable to destabilization, despite billions of dollars of reconstruction assistance. Second, this paper uses a comparative case design to test theories about elections against a wealth of empirical data. This contrasts with scholars of elections in Eastern Europe, who have focused on Central Europe, and to scholars of former Yugoslavia, who

have concentrated on one country and used district-level data.⁴ Third, it identifies factors that work to overcome tremendous centrifugal and exclusivist pressures generated by ethnic party systems, which are party systems dominated by ethnic parties, or parties that derive their support from, and appeal to, one ethnic group.⁵ Understanding factors that explain how an impoverished, deeply divided, and contested state with an ethnic party system encourages voting for moderates has significant implications for similarly fragile states, such as Afghanistan, Iraq, Rwanda, and Moldova.

New States Struggling with Deep Divisions

Bosnia and Macedonia are similarly fragile states burdened with historical experiences and party systems that currently discourage political compromise across ethnic lines. As in other regions burdened with the legacy of rule by empires, the peoples in South Eastern Europe do not match state boundaries, creating ripe conditions for ethnic entrepreneurs to threaten national integration, challenge state control, and deter democracy.⁶ The Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia sought to overcome such a legacy by employing a complex array of power-sharing strategies within a one-party system.⁷ Bosnia and Macedonia were the most heterogeneous republics, with Bosnian Muslims (now called Bosniaks), Serbs, and Croats dominating Bosnia; and Macedonians and Albanians dominating Macedonia (Table 1). Power-sharing strategies, which included quotas in governing bodies and the bureaucracy, as well as devolution to republics that were largely ethnically defined, reified and elevated the importance of ethnicity. This is despite the fact that most scholars view ethnicity as socially constructed. For example, Tone Bringa argues that Bosnia's citizens derived varying meanings from a census category of nationality such as Muslim, based on both their personal experiences and interactions with neighboring groups and their perceived relations to them.⁸ This is particularly the case given even recent disputes over the 'authenticity' of Muslims and Macedonians as unique ethnic-based nations. Indeed, it was the

Communist party that secured the recognition of both Muslims and Macedonians as ethnic-based nations. This occurred in 1945 for Macedonians and in 1971 for Muslims. Despite Socialist Yugoslavia's record of mainly positive interethnic relations, aspiring elites in the late 1980s Yugoslavia resurrected instances of interethnic violence to take advantage of a volatile mix of ideological bankruptcy, hyper-devolution, elite competition, economic decline, and mass frustration.⁹

Table 1

Upon the disintegration of Yugoslavia, both Bosnia and Macedonia struggled with developing not just new political, economic, and social systems, but also with defining their diverse states. While Macedonia's new constitution defined it ethnically, Bosnia's constitution specified it as a state of three constituent nations.¹⁰ The prospects that these similarly weak and divided former Yugoslav republics would survive as independent states looked grim in 1990. One scholar estimated Macedonia's chances as 50-50.¹¹ Another scholar warned that Bosnia could not survive without incorporation into a larger state.¹²

Though both countries are deeply ethnically divided, some argue that particular demographic details give Macedonia a better chance than Bosnia for effectively managing ethnicity. More specifically, some argue that Macedonia's advantage stems from the demographic domination¹³ of ethnic Macedonians and its predominantly two-group division. First, Macedonians' dominance of the state might allow their political representatives either to exercise effective control over minorities or to act more generously toward minorities.¹⁴ Yet, the transition experiences of Moldova and Croatia, two post-socialist countries with similar demographics whose policies that attempted to control minorities contributed to interethnic violence, demonstrate the dangers for Macedonia.¹⁵ That the nationalist-led government in Macedonia in 2001 bowed to international pressure to form a government of national unity suggests the existence of a greater generosity or

will of parties in Macedonia to cooperate across political lines in comparison with parties in Bosnia. Nonetheless, Macedonia's nationalist parties today advocate ethnic partition of the country. Second, while struggle between two rather than three groups could make it easier to cooperate over dividing spoils,¹⁶ empirical research suggests that conflict between two groups is more intense than conflict among three or more groups, which can allow for the formation of shifting alliances.¹⁷ Thus, despite particular differences in demographic characteristics, Bosnia and Macedonia confront similar challenges to compromise across ethnic lines.

This is especially true given that that historical importance of ethnicity, the socialist state's reinforcement of the political salience of ethnicity, and the chaos of transition contributed to the rise of ethnicity as the most powerful organizing principal for new political parties in 1990. These first multiparty, or founding, elections were the only opportunity for citizens of Yugoslavia to exercise political choice, and were thus viewed as a referendum on communist rule.¹⁸ Frustration with the communists' record of governance throughout Yugoslavia left the most prominent alternative parties – ethnic parties that derive their support from, and appeal to, one ethnic group – well positioned to dominate multiparty politics. Nationalists won the founding elections in both Bosnia and Macedonia, though they used more anti-communist than ethnocentric rhetoric and they won more convincingly in Bosnia than in Macedonia.¹⁹

Constitutional changes and policies adopted by nationalist parties of the majority group helped create anxiety among segments of minorities within Bosnia and Macedonia, anxiety that was stoked by co-ethnic nationalist leaders in neighboring countries. To this day, many political elites in neighboring states consider both Bosnia and Macedonia to be unviable and 'artificial.' Nationalist forces in neighboring countries armed and fought alongside domestic extremists who battled the central government in Bosnia (between 1992-5) and in Macedonia (for several months in 2001). Western governments and international organizations intervened in both countries to end the

violence and to mediate peace agreements—Dayton in Bosnia and Ohrid in Macedonia—that imposed ethnic power-sharing arrangements. These factors further heightened the political salience of ethnicity in both countries and created conditions conducive not just to ethnic parties but to transformation of the political party system into an ethnic party system, or one utterly dominated by ethnic parties.

Ethnic party systems compel all parties to take up ethnic causes, because a party of one ethnic group can rarely win the votes of other ethnic groups.²⁰ Because ethnic parties appeal to voters who belong to their own ethnic group, competition in ethnic party systems occurs almost solely *within* ethnic groups. The greater the number of parties competing for the vote of one ethnic group, the greater the incentive for parties to distinguish themselves by resorting to radical rhetoric, or ethnic outbidding.²¹ This dynamic encourages parties to argue that they are ‘more purely,’ for example, Macedonian and better able to protect vital Macedonian interests than other parties competing for the Macedonian vote. As an illustration, in the 2002 election campaign in Macedonia, the nationalist VMRO-DPMNE charged the Social Democratic Party of Macedonia with ‘stab[bing] a knife in the back of the country for accusing the VMRO-DPMNE-led government and not the [Albanian] terrorists for threatening Macedonia.’²² The proximity of the 1996 elections in Bosnia and the 2002 elections in Macedonia to interethnic violence bolsters incentives for parties to use ethnic invective in electoral campaigns in both states, dynamics that strengthen nationalist parties.

In both countries, internationals helped design the proportional representation electoral systems²³ that interact with deeply divided societies to make it difficult to govern without forming a multiethnic coalition.²⁴ In ethnically divided states, cross-ethnic cooperation can emerge either from multiethnic parties, which Macedonia and Bosnia lack, or from ethnic parties that are willing to cooperate across ethnic lines.²⁵ Willingness to cooperate across ethnic lines varies over time and

across situations.²⁶ I label parties ‘non-nationalist’ or ‘nationalist’ based on the campaign rhetoric recorded by local press, their party platforms, and on the analyses of international organizations involved in the elections. The strongest non-nationalist parties in the first elections after violence (1996 in Bosnia and 2002 in Macedonia) were social democratic—the Social Democratic Union of Macedonia (SDSM) and Bosnia’s Social Democratic Party (SDP). For example, SDP leaders advocate a ‘social-democratic system...understood as...[a] multiethnic and pluralistic democracy’.²⁷ In 2002, international observers characterized the SDSM as presenting itself ‘as a responsible alternative to VMRO-DMPNE’s radicalism, arrogance, and corruption.’²⁸ Both social democratic parties are firmly based in the majority ethnic groups. The 1997 and 2001 World Values Survey data show that a small percentage of Serbs and Croats (2.6 percent, or 15 of 581 respondents) expressed support for Bosnia's SDP, while *not a single* Albanian respondent supported Macedonia's SDSM. These social democratic parties were opposed by nationalist parties that work to both privilege their ethnic group in a territory and eschew interethnic cooperation.

Despite the similarity of Bosnia and Macedonia’s institutions and experiences, in the first national assembly elections after violence, citizens in Bosnia (in 1996) punished the non-nationalist social democrats, while citizens in Macedonia (2002) rewarded them (parties leading coalitions in bold in Table 2).²⁹

Table 2

Social democratic parties in both countries led pre-election coalitions that contained small parties representing small ethnic minorities in each country,³⁰ which simultaneously signified their willingness to engage in interethnic cooperation while avoided official links to their main ethnic rivals – Serbs in Bosnia and Albanians in Macedonia. In Bosnia’s 1996 election, the non-nationalist SDP-led coalition garnered only 4.8 percent of the seats in Bosnia's House of Representatives, while the incumbent nationalist parties won the Bosniak vote (Party of Democratic Action, or SDA), the

Serb vote (Serb Democratic Party, or SDS) and the Croatian vote (Croatian Democratic Union or HDZ). In Macedonia's 2002 election, the non-nationalist SDSM-led coalition captured 50 percent of the seats in Macedonia's parliament, besting an ethnic Macedonian coalition led by the nationalist Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization-Democratic Party for Macedonian National Unity (VMRO-DMPME). While it is impossible to calculate how much the SDSM's coalition partners helped it in 2002, the effect is unlikely to have been very large since its coalition partners had gathered only 3.3 percent of the assembly seats in the preceding election.³¹ Albanians elected the Democratic Union for Integration (DUI), which ran on a platform of integration even though it was led by a leader of the Albanian insurgency. Though this paper focuses only on the first elections after violence, these post-violence election results reflect the prevailing pattern in the post-socialist period. SDA has dominated Bosnia's House of Representatives since 1990, losing to the SDP only in 2000. SDSM has dominated the Macedonian National Assembly since 1991, losing decisively to VMRO-DPMNE only in 1998.

Even though parties' rhetoric on ethnic tolerance has varied across national-level elections held in post-socialist Macedonia,³² Macedonian voters have consistently rewarded parties that promote the most accommodative message toward minorities. How did Macedonia's voters immediately after violence overcome pressure to vote for nationalists?

Alternative Explanations

Popular values and behaviour contribute to solving this puzzle because they help determine voters' reactions to parties and to democratization more generally.³³ Though individual attitudes and behaviour cannot alone explain voting, which requires also a look at laws and institutions that structure elite and mass behaviour,³⁴ they are an understudied aspect of elections in South Eastern Europe. The similarity of Bosnia's and Macedonia's electoral rules strongly suggests that other factors explain the variation in support for non-nationalist parties. By focusing on individual

attitudes and behaviour of the majority group, this paper seeks to complement literature on South Eastern Europe that has centred on the impact of institutional designs for power sharing.³⁵ This paper explores alternative explanations for divergent election outcomes rooted in individual attitudes and social behaviour.

Ethnic identity. In ethnically divided societies, one prominent explanation for individuals' political views emphasizes social identities. Identity is more than one's ethnic background, which provides little information about how important and what meaning individuals give to this label. Social identity is 'that part of an individual's self-concept which derives from his knowledge of his membership in a social group (or groups) together with the value and emotional significance attached to that membership.'³⁶ As mentioned earlier, historical experience, socialist institutions, transition dynamics, and post-socialist institutions in South Eastern Europe combine to make ethnicity the most prominent social group. According to social identity theory, an individual who feels strong attachments to a particular social group--in these cases, ethnicity--is more likely to express distance from other groups. For example, a person who feels closely tied to her ethnic group is less willing to consider members of other ethnic groups as co-workers, neighbours, friends, or marriage partners. In addition, an individual who expresses strong bonds to her ethnic group tends to think and behave politically in ways that are distinct from non-group members.³⁷ This logic anticipates that a voter who expresses strong affiliation with his own ethnic group (or in-group) and strong antipathy toward other ethnic groups would tend to vote for nationalist parties. This is because nationalists campaign on prioritizing protection of ethnic group interests and the dangers of bowing to demands made by parties representing other ethnic groups. The patterns of violence in power suggest that Bosniaks should express higher levels of in-group affiliation, higher levels of distance from other ethnic groups, and thus a greater propensity to vote for nationalists than Macedonians. Bosniaks both experienced more intimate and lengthy violence and confronted

nationalists with a more extensive grip over resources than Macedonians in the run-up to post-conflict elections. In fact, ethnicity may be so politically salient among Bosniaks that it homogenizes Bosniaks' political party preferences toward nationalists, thus giving ethnic identity little leverage in explaining political choice.³⁸

On the other hand, a voter who does not feel particularly close to members of his ethnic group and who expresses tolerance toward other ethnic groups would be more willing to consider voting for political parties that campaign on advancing interests other than those of his ethnic group, such as prosperity and stability. A voter who is not overwhelmingly preoccupied with ethnic group interests may also be more likely to be influenced by ideology, partisanship, or social divisions other than ethnicity, such as class.³⁹ In short, a voter who does not feel closely tied to an ethnic group should be more open to factors that make voting for non-nationalist parties more attractive.

Social capital. Participation in groups that generate social capital, or the 'connections among individuals — social networks and the norms of reciprocity and trustworthiness that arise from them'⁴⁰ is also hypothesized to influence political behavior. In deeply divided societies, the impact of participation in groups that generate social capital on politics depends significantly on the type of social capital those groups promote. In divided societies, participation in groups that produce homogeneous or bonding social capital, particularly if those groups are focused on satisfying the interests of group members and are organized hierarchically, can adversely affect democracy by providing increased opportunities for ethnic entrepreneurs.⁴¹ Participation in groups that produce culturally inclusive bridging social capital, on the other hand, can assist interethnic peace and democratization.⁴² This is because working with those who may be ethnically different but possess similar social interests can create political interests that cross-cut ethnicity and build support for governance benefiting the whole, rather than a particular ethnic group. International democracy assistance to Eastern Europe may also help create more opportunities for individuals to

participate in voluntary organizations that build bridging social capital.⁴³ A ‘learning curve’ among donors⁴⁴ may make this assistance more effective in post-conflict Macedonia than in Bosnia, where intervention occurred earlier. According to social capital logic, voters participating in groups producing bridging social capital would be more likely to support non-nationalist parties than those participating in groups producing bonding social capital.

Negative voting. The outcome of elections may actually have little to do with individuals giving direct support for particular parties and their positions on ethnic or non-ethnic issues. Instead, voters may engage in negative voting, or voting motivated to punish a party. Bosnia and Macedonia’s transitional status creates incentives for negative voting. Parties in post-socialist states are organized top-down and often have few roots in society; one of their primary activities is engaging in rent-seeking.⁴⁵ These characteristics and behaviour often engender frustration among voters with governing parties and sometimes even political institutions. In addition, violence signals the breakdown of democratic governance. Some voters may resist blaming incumbent parties – in Bosnia and Macedonia, the nationalists – because they believe that governing parties did the best they could in the face of powerful threats to their country and ethnic group. Other citizens, however, may more directly hold incumbents responsible for poor governance, casting their ballot partly in order to vote against, or punish governing parties. For example, a UN official in Bosnia claimed that ‘protest voting’ against ruling parties that did not do enough to reform, rather than ‘nationalist voting,’ explained the SDP's loss in 2002.⁴⁶ Such claims are often made about elections in Eastern Europe but rarely tested. According to this theory, high levels of dissatisfaction with governance in Macedonia could help explain why voters punished the VMRO-led government in 2002 and instead elected its main challenger—the non-nationalists.

Method

A comparative case-study design helps uncover the complex and dynamic mechanisms that contribute to voting for non-nationalist parties by allowing for more in-depth analysis than possible in large cross-national research, various sources of data, and multiple methods. Surveys provide data that help characterize ethnic identity and activities that produce social capital. Content analysis of campaign messages in local press,⁴⁷ data on corruption, and public opinion about political institutions add information that helps assess the potential for negative voting. Statistical analysis of the 1997 and 2001 World Values Survey tests alternative hypotheses. Intensive interviews with Western policy makers involved in intervention in the two countries detail the potential role the international community played in bolstering support for non-nationalists.⁴⁸

Evaluating Grassroots Factors

In the following section, I first describe the patterns of ethnic identity, social capital, and negative political assessments found among Bosnian and Macedonian citizens in the immediate post-conflict period. I then investigate the influence of these factors on support for non-nationalist parties among the majority groups in both countries. I rely heavily on World Values survey data, which help test competing individual-level hypotheses for voting.⁴⁹ I use data collected in 1997 from Bosnia and in 2001 from Macedonia, the dates closest to the first post-violence elections. I grouped the individual parties for which respondents said they would vote into a category that distinguished between non-nationalists and nationalists.⁵⁰ This grouping reveals that Bosniak respondents expressed more homogeneous political views than Macedonians. While many respondents had difficulty choosing a political party,⁵¹ among Bosniak respondents who supported a party, 81.5 percent chose nationalists. In contrast, among Macedonian respondents who supported a party, 61.2 percent chose non-nationalists. In both countries, support for non-nationalists significantly varied by ethnic background. In Bosnia, Bosniaks and Serbs were significantly more willing than Croats to support non-nationalists, while in Macedonia, Macedonians were

significantly more willing than Albanians to support non-nationalists. This suggests that ethnicity is highly politically salient in *both* countries, rather than only in Bosnia.

Analysis uncovers several factors that combine to benefit Macedonia's non-nationalist challengers, which were led by the communist successor party. Macedonian supporters of non-nationalists expressed both strong positive associations with the past communist system and clear negative assessments of the governing record of the incumbent nationalists, sentiments that did not exist among Bosniaks.

Ethnic Identity. Overall, Macedonia's citizens expressed stronger ties to their ethnic identities than Bosnia's citizens. Surveys indicate that citizens of Macedonia have expressed consistently higher levels of ethnic distance than citizens of Bosnia.⁵² The best indicator in the World Values survey for ethnic identity is one question about ethnic distance. This question asks if respondents would reject living next to someone of a different religion (Appendix A), a category that now overlaps with ethnicity.⁵³ Of the majority groups in each country, a higher percentage of Macedonians (30.8 percent) than Bosniaks (19.4 percent) rejected living next to a neighbour of a different religion in the period immediately after violence (Table 3). This is quite surprising given the intensity and duration of violence in Bosnia. As expected, stronger ties to ethnic identity (and high levels of ethnic distance) are associated with lower levels of support for non-nationalist parties in Bosnia and in Macedonia, though these relationships just miss reaching the statistically significant level of .05. These data help refute social identity's proposition that Macedonians are more likely to vote for non-nationalists than Bosniaks because they have weaker attachments to their ethnic identities and thus less hostility toward those ethnically different than Bosniaks. The high political salience of ethnicity helps explain why the more nuanced notion of ethnic identity provides no leverage over explaining political choice.

Table 3

The apparent weak relationship between ethnic identity and political choice could allow for other factors like ideology and partisanship to influence support for non-nationalists. In both Bosnia and Macedonia, there is a statistically significant relationship between self-placement on the left-right ideological scale and support for non-nationalists. Suggesting the power of partisanship to the communist successor parties, there is a statistically significant relationship between evaluation of the communist party system and support for non-nationalists. The results of an exit poll conducted in 2002 in Macedonia lend further support to the role of party loyalty among Macedonians. It found that a significant percentage of Macedonians (46 percent) were motivated to vote by their 'trust in a party'.⁵⁴

Social capital. To examine the impact of respondents' views and participation in activities theorized to promote social capital on support for non-nationalists, I explored common individual-level indicators for social capital: involvement in non-hierarchical NGOs, interpersonal trust, and interest in politics.⁵⁵ Attendance at religious services gauges the potential influence of bonding social capital.

The nature of civic participation in both countries is more likely work against, rather than in favour of, tolerance and support for interethnic cooperation. The World Values Survey data indicate that citizens of Bosnia were more likely than citizens of Macedonia immediately after violence to participate in the types of voluntary organizations theorized to produce social capital supportive of civility and democracy (horizontally-organized, non-religious organizations). Sixty-five percent of Bosnian respondents and 44 percent of Macedonian respondents participated in such supposedly serendipitous organizations. But the NGOs in which they were most likely to engage are bonding organizations.⁵⁶ Sports clubs were among the most popular group in both states, with one-third of Bosnian respondents and 13 percent of Macedonian respondents reporting membership. After the war, sports teams in Bosnia generally divided along ethnic lines. Associated soccer fans-

hooligans raised tensions during matches between ethnic foes in Bosnia and at opposition rallies in Macedonia. In the latter case, a politician in the non-nationalist coalition was reportedly beaten after a campaign rally by a supporter of VMRO-DPMNE who led a local soccer club.⁵⁷ Unions and political parties are also ethnically divided. Other popular groups, such as those involving hobbies, which can be bridging even in the Balkans, tend to attract members who have lower levels of education than the average population,⁵⁸ another factor that would weaken the ability of civic organizations to promote tolerance. In both countries, the less interest in politics that citizens expressed the more likely they were to support non-nationalists, yet another indication that those most engaged in divided post-conflict societies may not be contributing to democratization. Interviews I conducted with policy makers suggested that international democracy assistance failed to present Macedonians with more opportunities to generate bridging social capital than those in Bosnia. One scholar-practitioner believed that the well-intentioned training in conflict resolution she helped conduct in Macedonia had little impact in social and political life because the local participants lacked a real life context where they felt it was safe and useful to implement the strategies they learned in workshops. Given these patterns, it is not surprising that participation in horizontally organized voluntary organizations has no clear association to support for non-nationalist parties.

Individuals in Bosnia and Macedonia who more frequently attended religious services, however, were significantly less likely to support non-national parties, associations statistically significant at the .05 level. These relationships reflect not only the hierarchical and bonding characteristics of religious institutions in the Balkans, but also probably their leaders' role in contributing to interethnic tension.

Negative Voting. To examine the influence of negative political assessments on support for non-nationalists, I used several different indicators. Those available from the World Values Survey

data included level of dissatisfaction with the performance of national office holders, belief that the country is run by a few big interests, and lack of confidence in various political institutions. In addition, an exit poll in Macedonia allowed for calculation of the percent of respondents who in the 2002 elections withdrew the support they gave to the incumbent nationalists in the previous election.

Statistical analysis shows that Macedonian and Bosnian voters dissatisfied with the performance of national office holders – the nationalists – increased their support for non-nationalists, logical relationships statistically significant at the .01 level. The poor records of governments reinforce incentives for challengers to blame society's ills on the incumbents.⁵⁹ In a common charge, SDSM accused VMRO-DPMNE of engaging in racketeering, failing to open new businesses, increasing unemployment, and lying by promising and then failing to create 200,000 new jobs.⁶⁰ Exit polls in Macedonia indicated that 30 percent of those who voted for VMRO-DPMNE in 1998 withdrew support from it in the 2002 elections, while SDSM lost only 14 percent between elections.⁶¹ As one U.S. diplomat argued, SDSM had the good fortune of sitting back and watching VMRO-DPMNE self-destruct. A tendency to punish VMRO-DPMNE is probably reinforced by those in the Macedonian electorate who look positively on the SDSM's record in charting the early stage of Macedonia's dangerous transition period. In contrast, full-blown war in Bosnia meant that not much governing was possible, thus removing a clear record on which citizens could base their vote.⁶²

Data suggest that voters' dissatisfaction in both Bosnia and Macedonia spread beyond particular parties to their political institutions (Table 4). When measures of lack of confidence in three types of political institutions — the parliament, political parties, and government⁶³ — are factor analyzed, all three indicators load heavily on one dimension. Those respondents in both countries who lacked confidence in the resulting index of these key political institutions increased at

a statistically significant level their support for non-nationalists.

Table 4

While respondents in both countries agreed at the time of the post-conflict elections that ‘the country is run by a few big interests’, a higher percentage agreed in Macedonia (92 percent of Macedonians and 96 percent of Albanians) than in Bosnia (55 percent of Bosniaks, 53 percent of Serbs, and 66 percent of Croats).⁶⁴ The more negative evaluation of corruption in Macedonia than in Bosnia increased the incentives for Macedonians to engage in protest voting. Indeed, views about the power of a few big interests increase support for non-nationalists only in Macedonia, where the relationship is also statistically significant at the .01 level.

Testing competing arguments. But do these bivariate relationships hold up in multivariate analysis? I created a logistic regression model to predict the likelihood that respondents of the majority group in Bosnia's Federation and in Macedonia would vote for non-nationalist political parties in their first post-violence national elections (Table 5). The political choices of members of the majority group are especially important in divided post-conflict societies because this group more than any other sets the tone for political dynamics in the state.⁶⁵ The model examines the possible influence of ethnic identity, social capital, and negative voting on support for non-nationalists. The model also considers the impact of ideological views important in divided post-socialist states, such as opinions about the role of the state in politics, society, and the economy (left-right self-placement and the extent to which the care of citizens is foremost a responsibility of the state); and partisanship to the communist successor party (views of the past communist system).⁶⁶ It also controls for demographic factors.

Table 5

Among the more interesting findings of the multivariate analysis are the factors that failed to significantly influence support for non-nationalist parties. Ethnic identity does not exert significant

impact on support for non-nationalists among Bosniaks or Macedonians. This result was foreshadowed by the earlier finding about the high political salience of ethnicity in both countries. High salience means that those respondents with the same ethnic background are likely to exhibit such similar political views that the more nuanced ethnic identity does not add any explanatory power. In addition, individual-level indicators of horizontal social capital perform poorly for both Bosniaks and Macedonians in the multivariate analysis. Membership in horizontal voluntary organizations has no statistically significant relationship to support for non-nationalist parties. Multivariate analysis confirms the bivariate analysis that there is no important positive spill over from engagement in non-hierarchical NGOs in deeply divided Bosnia and Macedonia into political choice.

To aid in interpretation of the statistical results, I created ideal types of voters. These help illustrate the support that an ‘average’ voter would give to non-nationalist parties, as well as the support granted by ‘extreme’ voters on opposite ends of the scale for factors found to be statistically significant (Tables 6 and 7).⁶⁷

Tables 6 and 7

Among Bosniaks, participation in organizations that produce bonding social capital – religious institutions – significantly decreases support for non-nationalist parties. Leaders of religious organizations in Bosnia often played a clear role supporting nationalist parties and contributing to conflict in Bosnia.⁶⁸ In an example during the 2002 campaign in Bosnia, an Islamic official in Sarajevo warned Bosniaks that ‘in-fighting’ within their own ethnic group would leave them vulnerable to ethnic foes. He scolded, ‘Bosniaks are not aware of how they are encircled by enemies; while Bosniaks look for culprits within their own ranks for all their misfortunes, their neighbours are sharpening their daggers...’⁶⁹ He then appealed to Bosniaks to close ranks behind

the nationalists. In comparison, Macedonian Orthodox officials have played a less visible role in politics.

The only other statistically significant factor to exert influence on Bosniak political preferences is self placement on the left-right ideological scale. Voters who placed themselves on the left end of the scale logically supported the social democrats. Given separate questions on government responsibility and views on the communist past, this factor seems to capture the influence of views not only on the government's role in the economy and society, but also toward social values.⁷⁰ The Bosnian war's disruption of political, economic, and social reform may make all these dimensions of reform more important for Bosniaks than for Macedonians, who were further along in their transition process when violence erupted.

Among Macedonians, on the other hand, the prominent debate about the communist legacy and the implied potential of communist successor parties to guide the country more clearly divide the electorate. Not surprisingly, those Macedonians who viewed the communist system more positively were more likely to support the social democratic party, a successor party that performed quite well in the first multiparty elections, orchestrated a gradual reform of the economic and political system, and avoided violence during governments it led.

The positive relationship between dismal assessments of incumbents and political institutions and support for non-nationalists continues to hold when submitted to multivariate regression only in the Macedonian case. Several factors seem to strengthen the power of negative voting in Macedonia and weaken it in Bosnia. During the Macedonian election, an international NGO publicly released a scathing report on endemic corruption in the VMRO-DPMNE-led government.⁷¹ In Bosnia, by contrast, journalists devoted some time to corruption, but their efforts were limited by real possibilities of violent retribution.⁷² Also, the chaos and insecurity of mass displacement that Bosniaks suffered and the grip that nationalists had over resources seemed to

make Bosniaks more inclined to swallow nationalist campaigns in Bosnia in 1996 that deflected blame for the war and corruption onto other ethnic groups. The more limited aftermath of violence in Macedonia, in contrast, appeared to serve more as a wakeup call to Macedonians who pinned some blame for violence and corruption on the incumbents – the nationalists — representing their own ethnic group. The international community’s response to the violence in Macedonia, which was viewed by scholars, as well as by practitioners I interviewed as swift and largely effective,⁷³ may have helped stem the violence before it became so widespread that Macedonians became as susceptible as Bosniaks to the nationalist rhetoric of protecting ‘vital’ ethnic group interests. Also, Macedonians’ distrust of key political institutions increased about six percentage points between 1997 and 2001 to the dismally high level displayed in Table 4. These findings lend support to the idea that Macedonians’ political choices in 2002 were at least partly motivated by punishing incumbents, even though the indicators of negative voting are far from exact.

The only demographic factor that matters for voting is level of education in Macedonia, which may indicate that the educational system in Macedonia has effectively socialized Macedonians into realizing that citizens should not support, or at least should not *acknowledge* support for, narrow interests that nationalist parties advocate. The recent intensely traumatic experiences of Bosniaks, as well as nationalist domination of the education system, may have diluted any possible positive consequences of education for eschewing nationalist parties.

Conclusion

Identifying factors that help voters in post-conflict societies overcome pressure to support exclusivism and instead support non-nationalists is important both for theory and for practice. These two cases suggested these factors and how they might interact, though they also raised additional questions for examination.

Non-nationalists in Macedonia benefited from the Macedonian electorate's trust in the SDSM, which navigated a potentially explosive early transition period. Support for non-nationalist parties in Macedonia, however, appears partly to be an artefact of voting that protests dysfunctional performance of the incumbent nationalists rather than a result of voting inspired by commitment to interethnic accommodation. Elections in summer 2006 will help reveal whether voters more positively evaluate the performance of the non-nationalist governing coalition and what influence their evaluation will have on their vote. A more thorough understanding of the greater success of non-nationalists in Macedonia requires field research involving intensive interviews and more tailored survey questions.

Ethnic identity did not help explain support for non-nationalist parties in Bosnia and Macedonia. Quite surprisingly given their shorter and less intense experience with violence in comparison with Bosniaks, Macedonians expressed greater hostility than Bosniaks toward other ethnic groups. A stronger test of the influence of ethnic identity, however, requires collecting additional data on the strength of ties to ethnic and other social groups, as well as views about engaging in different kinds of relationships other than neighbourly ones with persons of another ethnicity.

This analysis found that the nature of civic participation in divided, post-conflict societies is more likely to work against, not in favour of, support for non-nationalists. Participation in social groups in the divided post-conflict societies of Bosnia and Macedonia tended to produce bonding social capital negatively associated with support for non-nationalists.

The finding that Macedonians were partly motivated to vote against the incumbent nationalists in order to punish their ineffective and corrupt governance has positive implications for coexistence in its suggestion that voters were willing to consider concrete policies of governing parties representing their own ethnic group, rather than merely reacting to the symbolic politics of

ethnicity. It, however, also suggests the fragility of political support for cross-ethnic cooperation because it was not a vote directly in favour of the non-nationalists. Negative voting, intolerance, corruption, poverty, unstable neighbours, and a long EU accession process combine to create conditions ripe for instability in Macedonia.

Appendix A

Coding of Variables Used in Table 5 (European Values 2004)

Ethnic identity	1=respondent who mentioned unwillingness to live next to a neighbour of a different religion; 0=if respondent did not mention unwillingness to live next to a neighbour of a different religion
Lack of confidence in political institutions	An index consisting of three items measuring: confidence in government, political parties, and parliament*
Dissatisfaction with nat'l office holders	Extent satisfied that those holding national offices are handling the country's affairs: 1=very satisfied to 4=very dissatisfied.
View gov't as run by a few big interests	1=believe that government is run for all the people; 2 believe that country run by a few big interests
Left-Right placement	Self placement of political views on a scale of 1=left to 10= right
Positive view of communist system	A scale of views of the former communist political system: Ranges from 1=very bad to 10=very good
Government should provide for all	A scale of views ranging from 1: people are responsible for providing for themselves; to 10: gov't should ensure that everyone is provided for
Interpersonal trust	1=agree that most people can be trusted; 0=one needs to be very careful
Interest in politics	0=if not at all interested in politics, 1=not very interested in politics; 2=somewhat interested, and 3=very interested in politics
Member NGO (not religious)	1= if respondent was a member in at least 1 of the following voluntary organizations: political parties, sports, arts, unions, environmental, health, professional, youth, service, charity, local, human rights, peace, other; 0=if respondent did not belong to a voluntary organization
Attend religious services	Attend religious services: 1=never; 2 < 1/year; 3=once a year; 4=special holy days; 5=once a month; 6=once a week; 7= > 1/week
Education	1=none; 2=some primary; 3=complete primary; 4=some secondary technical; 5=complete secondary technical; 6=some secondary university-prep; 7=complete secondary university prep; 8=some university education; 9=completed university
Income	Increasing scale of monthly income before taxes
Age cohort	1=if 18-24; 2=25-34; 3=35-44; 4=45-54; 5=55-64; 6=if > 65 yr
Gender	0=if female; 1=if male
Settlement type	If reside in a town: 1=< 2,000; 2=2,000-5,000; 3= 5-10,000; 4=10-20,000; 5=20-50,000; 6=50-100,000; 7=100-500,000; 8= > 500,000

*Index of trust in political institutions:	Factor loadings (Bosnia)	Factor loadings (Macedonia)
Confidence in government	.715	.740
Confidence in political parties	.612	.545
Confidence in parliament	.795	.764
N	551	734
Eigenvalue	1.518	1.427
Chronbach's alpha	.780	.850

Table 1: Similar Cases

	Bosnia	Macedonia
Political history	Ethnically heterogeneous republic of Socialist Yugoslavia	Ethnically heterogeneous republic of Socialist Yugoslavia
Electoral System	Proportional Representation with multi-member districts	Proportional Representation with multi-member districts
Party Systems	Ethnic Party System	Ethnic Party System
Recent interethnic violence	1992-1995	2001
Internationally imposed post-war agreement	Ethnic power-sharing arrangements	Ethnic power-sharing arrangements
Size	Population of 3.5 million	Population of 2 million
Ethnic Distribution	Bosniaks = 48.3 %, Serbs= 34 %, Croats =15.4 percent, & others = 2.3 %	Macedonians = 64.2 %, Albanians=25.2%, and Turks, Roma, Serbs, Bosniaks, & Vlachs= 10.6%
Economy	GNP/capita: \$6,100 (PPP) Unemployment: 40%	GNP/capita: \$6,700 (PPP) Unemployment: 31.9%
Neighbourhood	Extremists in neighbouring countries express irredentist claims; Serbia & Croatia have pursued them	Extremists in neighbouring countries express irredentist claims; only those in Kosovo have pursued them

Sources: For ethnic distribution: *Early Warning System: Bosnia and Herzegovina, Annual Report*, UN Development Programme, 2002, <http://www.undp.ba/index.aspx?PID=14>; and *Popis 2002* (Skopje, Republika Makedonija drzavni zavod za statistika, 2003), <http://www.stat.gov.mk/pdf/10-2003/2.1.3.30.pdf>.

For the economy: 'Bosnia and Herzegovina.' *CIA factbook*, 2003. <http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/mk.html#Econ>; and *Human Development Report for FYR Macedonia*, UN Development Programme, 2004.

Table 2: Post-Conflict Election Results for National Assemblies in Macedonia and Bosnia

<i>Parties competing in Bosnia's 1996 House of Representatives (Zastupnicki dom parlamentarne skupstine)</i>	<i>% of seats won in Bosnia</i>	<i>Party competing in Macedonia's 2002 National Assembly (Sobranie)</i>	<i>% of seats won in Macedonia</i>
Party of Democratic Action (SDA)	45.2	Social Democratic Alliance of Macedonia (SDSM)-led coalition	50.0
Serb Democratic Party (SDS)	21.4	Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization-Democratic Party of Macedonian National Unity (VMRO-DPMNE)-led coalition	27.5
Croatian Democratic Union BiH (HDZ)	19.0	Democratic Union for Integration (DUI)	13.3
Social Democratic Party-(SDP)-led coalition	4.8	Democratic Party of Albanians (DPA)	5.8
Party for Bosnia and Herzegovina (SBiH)	4.8	Party for Democratic Prosperity (PDP)	1.7
Peoples union for peace & progress	4.8	National Democratic Party	.8
		Socialist Party	.8

Source: Elections in Bosnia: Izborna Komicija Bosne i Hercegovine, 2002. <http://www.izbori.ba/Rezultati%20izbora%202002.htm>; Elections in Macedonia: 'Rezultati', Drzavna Izbona Komisija na Republika Makedonija, 2002, <http://www.izbori.gov.mk/>.

Table 3: Levels of ethnic distance, by citizenship and ethnicity

	BOSNIA in 1997			MACEDONIA in 2002	
	Bosniaks	Croats	Serbs	Macedonians	Albanians
% who mentioned that they would not live next to a neighbour of another religion	19.4	16.0	46.9	30.8	14.8

Source: European Values Study Group and World Values Survey Association 2004.

N=1189 for Bosnia

N=1055 for Macedonia

Table 4: Lack of confidence in political institutions

% Distrusting Political institution:	BOSNIA in 1997			MACEDONIA in 2001	
	Bosniaks	Croats	Serbs	Macedonians	Albanians
Political Parties	54.0%	60.0%	49.0%	92.8%	75.9%
Parliament	41.0%	55.0%	50.0%	91.8%	96.6%
Government	24.0%	46.1%	29.0%	86.9%	80.2%

Source: European Values Study Group and World Values Survey Association 2004.

N=694 for Bosnia; n=1055 for Macedonia

Table 5: Dependent Variables = Probability (Vote for Non-nationalist Parties*) Among Majority Groups In Bosnia (in 1997) And Macedonia (in 2001)

Independent Variables	(Bosnia's Federation)		(Macedonia)	
	b	s.e.	b	s.e.
ETHNIC IDENTITY	-.438	.443	-.547	.573
IDEOLOGY:				
Left-Right self placement	-.224**	.085	-.047	.055
Positive view of communist system	.017	.067	.104**	.046
Government should provide for all	.067	.057	.092	.052
SOCIAL CAPITAL:				
Interpersonal trust	.132	.398	-.468	.392
Interest in politics	-.276	.178	.264	.166
Member NGO (not religious)	-.002	.331	.348	.282
Religious Attendance	-.319**	.081	-.041	.101
DISSATISFACTION:				
Lack of confidence in political institutions	.018	.205	.612**	.179
Dissatisfaction with national office holders	.354	.248	.380**	.184
View gov't as run by a few big interests	.298	.337	.887	.482
DEMOGRAPHICS:				
Education	.111	.088	.176**	.083
Income	.038	.092	-.119	.151
Age cohort	.220	.129	.014	.091
Gender	-.303	.319	.144	.288
Rural-urban residence	-.103	.076	.012	.054
Constant	-.852	1.519	-2.07	1.531

Source: European Values Study Group and World Values Survey Association 2004.

* In Bosnia's Federation, non-nationalists competing for the Bosniak vote in 1997 = Social Democratic Party and the Civic Democracy Party. In Macedonia, non-nationalists competing for the ethnic Macedonian vote in 2001= Social Democratic Union of Macedonia, the Liberal Democratic Party; and the Democratic Alternative.

**=significant at the .05 level

$N=354$ for Bosnia's Federation, and $N=324$ for Macedonia

Log Likelihood (Bosnia's Federation) -149.163; Log Likelihood (Macedonia) -174.021

Probability $> \chi^2 .001$ (Bosnia's Federation); Probability $> \chi^2 .000$ (Macedonia)

Percent of votes correctly predicted: 82% (Bosnia's Federation); 73% (Macedonia)

Table 6: Interpreting Support Among Bosniaks For Non-nationalist Parties in 1997

Ideal Type	Probability of voting for non-nationalist political parties
A Bosniak who attends religious services rarely and places himself on the far left end of the ideological spectrum	.56
An 'average' Bosniak respondent	.15
A Bosniak who attends religious services more than once a day and places herself on the far right end of the ideological spectrum	.02

Source of data: European Values 2004.

Table 7: Interpreting Support Among Macedonians For Non-nationalist Parties in 2001

Ideal Type	Probability of voting for non-nationalist political parties
A Macedonian who is extremely dissatisfied with the government, political parties, parliament, and national office holders; views communism extremely positively; and has completed a college education	.94
An 'average' Macedonian respondent	.42
A Macedonian who is extremely satisfied with the government, political parties, parliament, and national office holders; views communism extremely negatively; and has not completed primary education	.25

Source of data: European Values 2004.

¹ This paper has benefited from comments received from Valerie Bunce, Cynthia Kaplan, Kevin Deegan-Krause, Robert Hislope, Paul Manna, and Chris Wlezien. I appreciate research assistance from Allie Rosner, Adam G. Smith, Michael Zose, Sladjana Dankovic, Lidija Sokolova, and Melissa Shoemaker. I am indebted to Hans Klingemann for granting early access to access to the 2001 World Values Survey data for Bosnia and Macedonia. This research received support from the College of William and Mary and the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars.

² I use the term 'ethnic group' to refer to the nominal members of an ascriptive category. Like Chandra I do not use the term to imply active participation in a common group identity. Kanchan Chandra, *Why Ethnic Parties Succeed: Patronage and Ethnic Head Counts in India* (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2004), 2. How individuals interpret the meaning of a group identity, such as ethnic identity, is an empirical question that I explore.

³ The country names recognized by the U.S. are Bosnia-Herzegovina and The Republic of Macedonia. For convenience, I will use Bosnia and Macedonia in this paper.

⁴ For analyses of elections in Central Europe, see: Paul G. Lewis, *Party Development and Democratic Change in Post-Communist Europe* (London, Frank Cass; 2001); Richard Rose and Neil Munro, *Elections and Parties in New European Democracies* (Washington D.C., CQ Press, 2004); Natalia Letki and Geoffrey Evans, 'Endogenizing Social Trust: Democratization in East Central Europe', *British Journal of Social Science*, 35, 3, 2005, pp. 515-29. For informative single-country studies, see: Sumantra Bose, *Bosnia after Dayton: Nationalist Partition and International Intervention* (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2002); and Robert Hislope, 'Organized Crime in a Disorganized State: How Corruption Contributed to Macedonia's Mini-War', *Problems of Post-Communism*, 49, 3, 2002, pp. 33-41. For analysis of district-level election data, see: Michael Pugh and Margaret Cobble; and Nina Caspersen, 'Good fences Make Good Neighbours? A Comparison

of Conflict-Regulation Strategies in Postwar Bosnia', *Journal of Peace Research*, 41, 5, 2004, pp. 569-88.

⁵ Donald Horowitz, *Ethnic Groups in Conflict* (Berkeley, University of California Press, 1985), p 299.

⁶ Jansz Bugajski, 'The Fate of Minorities in Eastern Europe.' *Journal of Democracy*, 4, October 1993, pp. 85-99; Philip G. Roeder, 'Peoples and States after 1989: The Political Costs of Incomplete National Revolutions', *Slavic Review*, 58, Winter 1999, pp. 854-882; and Valerie Bunce, 'Promoting Democracy in Divided Societies,' manuscript presented for the APSA task force on difference and inequality in the developing world, 2005.

⁷ Paul Shoup, *Communism and the Yugoslav Nationalist Question* (New York, Columbia University Press, 1968).

⁸ Tone Bringa, 'Nationality Categories, National Identification and Identity Formation in 'Multinational' Bosnia', *Anthropology of East Europe Review*, 11, 1-2, 1993, pp. 69-76.

⁹ Sabrina Ramet, *Nationalism and Federalism in Yugoslavia*, Second Ed. (Bloomington, Indiana University Press, 1992); Susan Woodward *Balkan Tragedy* (Washington D.C., The Brookings Institution, 1995); and Anthony Oberschall, 'The Manipulation of Ethnicity: From Ethnic Cooperation to Violence and War in Yugoslavia', *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, 23, November 2000, pp. 982-1001.

¹⁰ Branislav Milinković, ed., *Novi ustavi na tlu bivše Jugoslavije* (Beograd, 'Mednarodna Politika' Pravni Fakultet, Fakultet Političkih Nauka, 1995).

¹¹ Duncan Perry, 'The Republic of Macedonia and the Odds for Survival', *RFE/RL Research Report*, November 20, 1992, p. 19.

¹² Steven L. Burg, 'Bosnia Herzegovina: a case of failed democratization', in Karen Dawisha and Bruce Parrott (eds), *Politics, Power, and the Struggle for Democracy in South-East Europe* (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1997), pp. 22-41.

¹³ Though both countries were mixed, Bosnia's tradition of governance is ethnic power sharing, while Macedonia's is ethnic dominance. Florian Bieber, 'The Challenge of Institutionalizing Ethnicity in the Western Balkans', *European Yearbook of Minority Issues*, 3, 2003/4, pp. 89-110. This is because the Communists granted group guarantees in governance and public office only to constituent peoples of the country—which Muslims, Serbs, and Croats were since 1971—not to national minorities such as Albanians, whose putative homeland exists beyond Yugoslavia.

¹⁴ On policies of control over minorities, see Carter Johnson, "Remarkable Peace: Democratic Transition in the Balkans," manuscript, 2001, pp. 2-25. On policies of generosity toward minorities, see Robert Hislope, 'Ethnic Conflict and the 'Generosity Moment'', *Journal of Democracy*, 9, 1998, pp. 140-153.

¹⁵ On Croatia's minority policies, see Lenard J. Cohen, *Broken Bonds*, Second Ed. (Boulder, Westview Press, 1995). On Moldova's minority policies, see Lucan A. Way, 'Weak State and Pluralism: The Case of Moldova', *East European Politics and Societies*, 17, 2003, pp. 454-82. Putative homelands of minorities significantly contributed to violence in both countries.

¹⁶ Hislope, 'Organized Crime.'

¹⁷ Marvin W. Mikesell and Alexander Murphy 'A Framework for Comparative Study of Minority Group Aspirations', *Annals of the Association of American Geographers*, 81, 1991, pp. 581-604.

¹⁸ Ivan Šiber, 'The Impact of Nationalism, Values, and Ideological Orientations on Multi-Party Elections in Croatia,' in Jim Seroka and Vukasin Pavlovic (eds), *The Tragedy of Yugoslavia: The Failure of Democratic Transformation* (Armonk: M.E. Sharpe, 1992), pp. 141-71.

¹⁹ In Bosnia, the nationalist Bosniak party (SDA) won 35.85 percent of the national parliament's seats in 1990, while the social democratic party won 5.83 percent. Suad Arnautović, *Izbori u Bosni i Hercegovini 1990* (Sarajevo, Promocult, 1996), p. 108. In Macedonia, the nationalist Macedonian party (VMRO) won 31.1 percent of the national parliament's seats in 1990, while the social

democratic party won 26.1 percent. *The 1990 Elections in the Republics of Yugoslavia*, (Washington: DC: International Republican Institute for International Affairs, 1991). The nationalist-led coalition government in Macedonia soon fell in a vote of no confidence, turning over power to a social democratic-led coalition.

²⁰ Horowitz.

²¹ Paul Mitchell, 'Party competition in an Ethnic Dual Party System.' *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 18, 4, 1995, pp. 773-93. Gagnon argues that in Serbia, ethnic outbidding was not practiced by Milosević during election campaigns because voters in Serbia were not supportive of ethnically radical ideas. V.P. Gagnon, *The Myth of Ethnic War* (Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 2004). The notion of an ethnic party system and its political dynamics of ethnic outbidding are less applicable to Serbia, than to Bosnia and Macedonia. In Serbia, all viable political parties are ethnically Serb and minority parties pose no serious threat to Serb control of political power. This is because of the demographic dominance of Serbs within Serbia (66 percent of Serbia is ethnically Serb), which is amplified by the boycott of the largest minority – the Albanians (17.2 percent of Serbia) – of the elections for the national parliament. In contrast, minorities are demographically more powerful and their parties play significant roles in national parliaments in Bosnia and Macedonia.

²² 'VMRO-DPMNE and LP in Probistip', *Dnevnik*, September 2002.

²³ Election to the national assemblies in Bosnia and Macedonia is determined through multi-member electoral districts. Bosnia's electoral law in 1996 split the country into two electoral districts for the National Assembly elections, one in the Federation and one in the RS. Bose, p. 219. Macedonia's 2002 electoral law split the country into six multimember districts. 'Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia: Parliamentary Elections 15 September 2002', *OSCE/ODIHR Election Observation Mission, Final Report* (Warsaw, Poland, OSCE's Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, 2002). Though Macedonia's 2002 law appeared to help decrease the votes for

small, non-geographically based parties in comparison with the prior electoral rules (Pearson, p. 11), this decrease did not significantly affect the battle over the ethnic Macedonian vote between the two dominant coalitions.

²⁴ Even if Bosniaks, who make up about 48 percent of the population, voted only for one Bosniak party, that Bosniak party would not be able to make laws without the support of either a Croat or a Serb party in the Federal Assembly. Furthermore, power-sharing arrangements in Bosnia's case require the government to be tri-ethnic. *The General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia-Herzegovina* (Sarajevo, Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, 1995), Annex 4 <http://www.oscebih.org/overview/gfap/eng/default.asp>. In contrast, if ethnic Macedonians, who make up 64 percent of the population, threw their support behind just one Macedonian party then it that party could pass legislation without support of an Albanian or other smaller minority party.

²⁵ Mitchell, p. 777; and Bose.

²⁶ Chandra.

²⁷ G. M., 'Nacionalne stranke gube smisao postajanja', *Oslobodjenje*. 31 August 2002. My classification matches those made by other scholars and those by Western NGOs assisting and analyzing parties in the countries. (Michael Pugh and Margaret Cobble, 'Non-Nationalist Voting in Bosnian Municipal Elections: Implications for Democracy and Peacebuilding', *Journal of Peace Research* 38, 1, pp. 33-34; and National Democratic Institute for International Affairs, *Macedonian Parliamentary Elections 2002, Election Watch Report 1* (Washington, DC, 15 August 2002). Nationalists are often willing to 'cooperate' to divide spoils.

²⁸ *Election Observation Mission: Report and Recommendations* (Washington, DC, International Republican Institute, September 15, 2002), p. 34.

²⁹ Though international election observers reported violations of electoral rules in Macedonia's 2002 elections, some of these experts told me they do not believe these violations altered the

outcome. The 1996 elections in Bosnia were probably more problematic, given limited freedom of movement (though mechanisms, such as absentee voting, were in place to try counteract that effect) and intimidation that occurred during the registration process (Pugh and Cobble, p. 28).

³⁰ In Bosnia, SDP led the United List, which also included the Union of Bosnian Social Democrats, the Republican Party, the Muslim Bosniak Organization and the Croat Peasant Party. In Macedonia, SDSM led the coalition, Together For Macedonia, which included the Liberal Democratic Party, the Green Party, the Labor-Agricultural Party, the Socialist-Christian Party, and parties from the Roma, Bosniak, Vlach, Turk, and Serb communities.

³¹ 'Rezultati', Drzavna Izbona Komisija na Republika Makedonija, 2003, <http://www.izbori.gov.mk/>.

³² *Macedonia's Presidential Election 1999: A Report Prepared by the Staff of the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe* (Washington, D.C. 1999); Keith Brown, 'Macedonia: Prevention Can Work', *Special Report 58* (Washington, D.C.: US Institute of Peace, 27 March 2000).

³³ Russell Dalton, 'Citizen Attitudes and Political Behavior,' *Comparative Political Studies*, 33, 6-7, 2000, pp. 912-940.

³⁴ Rose and Munro.

³⁵ Bose; Bieber; and European Commission for Democracy Through Law, 'Opinion on the Constitutional Situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Powers of the High Representative', 2005.

http://www.venice.coe.int/SITE/DYNAMICS/N_RECENT_EF.ASP?L=E&TITLE1=62ND%20PLENARY%20SESSION&TITLE2=62E%20SESSION%20PLÉNIÈRE. These findings point to the dangers that rigid power-sharing arrangements pose to the consolidation of democracy due to their elevation of ethnicity into political competition.

³⁶ Henri Tajfel, 'Social Categorization, Social Identity and Social Comparison', in Henri Tajfel, ed, *Differentiation between Social Groups: Studies in the Social Psychology of Intergroup Relations* (New York, Academic Press, 1978), p. 63.

³⁷ Robert Levine and Donald T. Campbell, *Ethnocentrism: Theories of Conflict, Ethnic Attitudes, and Group Behavior* (New York, Wiley, 1971).

³⁸ This is an extension of Brady and Kaplan's argument about ethnic identity among ethnic Estonians. Henry E. Brady and Cynthia S. Kaplan, 'Categorically Wrong? Nominal versus Graded Measures of Ethnic Identity,' *Studies in Comparative International Development*, 35, 3, Fall 2000, pp. 56-91.

³⁹ Seymour M. Lipset and Stein Rokkan, *Party Systems and Voter Alignments: Cross-National Perspectives* (New York, Free Press, 1967).

⁴⁰ Robert D. Putnam, *Bowling Alone* (New York, Simon and Schuster, 2000), p. 19.

⁴¹ Analyzing 1995-7 World Values Survey data, Dowley and Silver found that high levels of social capital among minorities in post-communist countries resulted in lower support for democratic institutions and principles, partly due to their marginalization in the state. Kathleen M. Dowley and Brian D. Silver, 'Social capital, ethnicity and support for democracy in the post-socialist states', *Europe-Asia Studies*, 54, June 2002, pp. 505-528. In the U.S. case, see Rodney E. Hero, 'Social Capital and Racial Inequality in America', *Perspectives*, 1, March 2003, pp. 113-122.

⁴² Ashutosh Varshney, *Ethnic Conflict and Civic Life: Hindus and Muslims in India* (New Haven, Yale University Press, 2001).

⁴³ Thomas Carothers, *Aiding democracy abroad* (Washington, D.C., Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1999).

⁴⁴ Carothers and Bieber (p. 92) discuss the notion of a 'learning curve'.

⁴⁵ Hislope, 'Organized Crime;' and Frank Schimmelfennig, 'Introduction', in Ronald Linden (ed.),

Norms and Nannies: The Impact of International Organizations on the Central and East European States (Lanham, MD, Rowman & Littlefield, 2002), pp. 1-29.

⁴⁶ Office of the High Representative to Bosnia and Herzegovina, ‘Twenty-third Report by the High Representative for Implementation of the Peace Agreement to the Secretary-General of the United Nations’, 23 October 2002, 7. http://www.ohr.int/other-doc/hr-reports/default.asp?content_id=28227, accessed April 1, 2004.

⁴⁷ A random selection of 350 articles on the elections from two independent newspapers--*Oslobodjenje* (Liberation) in Bosnia and *Dnevnik* (Daily) in Macedonia—provides the basis for systematic analysis of campaign rhetoric by a qualitative data-analysis program. Scolari, *QSR NUD*IST 4* (Thousand Oaks, C.A., Sage Publications Software, 1997). These newspapers facilitate comparison because they target readers from the majority group, possess moderate ideologies, and provide some coverage of minorities’ campaigns (National Democratic Institute 2002; Office for Democratic Institutions 2002). I have completed the Macedonian part of the analysis, but am still working on the Bosnian part of the analysis.

⁴⁸ In September 2005, I conducted interviews with 35 Western elites involved in intervention into Bosnia and Macedonia, including former and current officials of the US State Department, US Agency for International Development, the EU, Western-based international organisations and NGOs. Because the vast majority of interviewees requested anonymity, I do not cite them by name. Of those interviewed, five are Ambassadors. I located many officials for interviewing through their current professional positions involving assistance to the Balkans. I used snowballing to locate additional persons for interviews. Such a sample prevents generalization.

⁴⁹ European Values Study Group and World Values Survey Association, *European and World Values Surveys Integrated Data File*, 1999-2002, Release 1 [Computer file]. 2nd ICPSR version, 2004. The World Values Survey data are the only individual-level data on Bosnia and Macedonia

that I have located. Unfortunately, they are not designed to predict voting and thus lack some variables commonly used to predict voting, including past voting record; evaluations of retrospective personal and national economic situations, and the ethnic distribution of respondents' localities. More rigorous testing of hypotheses I explored here requires individual-level data better suited than the World Values Survey data to identifying determinants of voting.

⁵⁰ In Bosnia in 1997, non-nationalists listed in the survey included SDP, the Civic Democracy Party, and the Independent Social Democrats. In Macedonia in 2001 non-nationalists listed in the survey included SDSM, the Liberal Democratic Party, the Democratic Alternative, and the Party of Democratic Prosperity, though the latter party's rhetoric became increasingly nationalistic as the elections approached. Because the survey did not group together parties that ran together in coalitions, it is unclear whether respondents supporting individual non-nationalist parties took into consideration the multiethnic composition of the coalitions in which these parties participated. Given the controversy over multiethnicity in deeply divided post-conflict states, it is possible that by excluding non-nationalist parties from more controversial multiethnic coalitions in which they ran, the World Values Survey over-estimated the extent of support for non-nationalist parties.

⁵¹ I deleted 'don't know,' 'no answer,' and 'would not vote' responses from the analyses. This eliminated 24 percent of the Bosniak sample and 46 percent of the Macedonian sample.

⁵² Dragomir Pantić, 'Nacionalna distanca građana Jugoslavije', in Bjiljana Bacević et. al (eds), *Jugoslavia na kriznoj prekretnici* (Beograd, Institut Drustvenih Nauka, 1991), pp. 168-186; European Values

⁵³ In Bosnia, citizens of Orthodox background are largely Serb, those of Catholic background are overwhelmingly Croat, and those of Muslim background generally consider themselves Bosniaks. In Macedonia, citizens of the Orthodox background generally consider themselves Macedonian, though some identified as Serbs and those of Muslim background generally consider themselves

Albanian, though some Muslims declared themselves Turks, Roma, or Bosniaks. This indicator of ethnic identity is far from ideal. However, indicators of ethnic identity similar to those used by Brady and Kaplan, such as ethnic distance, language spoken at home, and religious denomination, do not load heavily onto one dimension when they are factor analyzed. The World Values survey lacks other data that Brady and Kaplan (pp. 67-71) use to measure ethnic identity, including other indicators of ethnic distance, such as distance from co-workers, friends, and relatives of another ethnicity. It also lacks information on evaluation of other ethnic groups and the language of media that respondents consume. A more rigorous test of the influence of ethnic identity on political choice requires the collection and analysis of additional data along these lines.

⁵⁴ Williams and Associates, p. 10.

⁵⁵ Dowley and Silver, pp. 507-509.

⁵⁶ The World Values Surveys do not provide data on the ethnic makeup of NGOs, but most NGOs in the region are mono-ethnic. Jennifer Stuart, ed., *The 2002 NGO Sustainability Index* (Washington D.C., US Agency for International Development, 2003), http://www.usaid.gov/locations/europe_eurasia/dem_gov/ngoindex/2002/index.htm .

⁵⁷ Slobodan Sodik, 'Vdještena atmosfera vikendov pod Markovite kuli', *Dnevnik*, 10 September 2002.

⁵⁸ Marc Hooghe, 'Voluntary Associations and Democratic Attitudes: Value Congruence as a Causal Mechanism', in Marc Hooghe and Dietlind Stolle (eds), *Generating Social Capital: Civil Society and Institutions in Comparative Perspective* (New York, Palgrave MacMillan, 2003), pp. 89-113.

⁵⁹ Kim Fridkin Kahn and Patrick J. Kenney, *The Spectacle of U.S. Senate Campaigns* (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1999).

⁶⁰ 'For Negotino and Kavadarci', *Dnevnik*, 2 September 2002

⁶¹ Williams and Associates, *Exit Poll Analysis: Republic of Macedonia 2002 Parliamentary*

Elections (Washington, DC, International Republican Institute, 2002), p. 24.

⁶² Unfortunately, I lack data from Bosnia to identify those who defected from parties they supported in the elections prior to 1996.

⁶³ Though confidence in government can also be seen as a test of partisanship, rather than of negative voting, the World Values Survey lacks a better measure for protest voting, such as a question identifying respondents who abandoned parties they supported in the prior election for different ones in post-violence elections.

⁶⁴ European Values.

⁶⁵ This is not to deny that minorities, particularly those with neighbors who are putative homelands, play critical roles in post-conflict politics. Indeed, though I lack data to test it, the apparent self-restraint of Macedonia's Albanians in calling for greater autonomy rather than full independence probably weakens the resonance of rhetoric by ethnic Macedonian nationalists. The political decisions of minorities deserve further attention, along the lines given by Dowley and Silver to minorities' political views and social behavior in post-socialist states.

⁶⁶ Herbert Kitschelt, Zdenka Mansfeldova, Radoslaw Markowski, and Gabor Toka, *Post-communist party systems: competition, representation, and inter-party cooperation* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999); Kevin Deegan Krause, 'Public Opinion and Party Choice in Slovakia and the Czech Republic', *Party Politics*, 6, 1, 2000, pp. 23-46.

⁶⁷ In logistic regression, the effect of a variable depends on where in the logistic curve we are evaluating the effect. In determining the effect of each statistically significant independent variable, I have calculated the effect of each independent variable at the value specified while also choosing to fix the values of all other independent variables at their means. The command in Stata 8 is 'prvalue.'

⁶⁸ Lenard J. Cohen, 'Prelates and Politicians in Bosnia: The Role of Religion in Nationalist

Mobilisation', *Nationalities Papers*, 25, September 1997, pp. 481-499; and Srdjan Dizdarević, *Izbori su prilika da zemlja izadje iz krize* (Sarajevo, Helsinski komitet za ljudska prava u Bosni i Hercegovini, 2002), <http://www.bh-hchr.org/Saopstenja/01-10-02.htm>.

⁶⁹ Nezim Halilović, 'Violence', 6 September 2002 sermon, <http://www.sehara.com>, accessed 13 September 2002.

⁷⁰ Kitschelt et al., pp. 286-88.

⁷¹ 'Macedonia's Public Secret: How Corruption Drags the Country Down', *Balkans Report No. 133*, (Skopje, International Crisis Group, 14 August 2002), <http://www.crisisweb.org/home/index.cfm?id=1693&l=1> .

⁷² Even in 1998, an investigative journalist in Banja Luka lost a leg in a car bombing believed to be retribution for his reports on corruption within the Republika Srpska's government.

⁷³ Brown; Brenda Pearson, 'Putting Peace into Practice: Can Macedonia's New Government Meet the Challenge?' *Special Report 96* (Washington, DC, US Institute of Peace, 2002); Yenryk Sokalski, *An Ounce of Prevention* (Washington D.C., U.S. Institute of Peace, 2003); Alice Ackermann, *Making Peace Prevail: Preventing Violent Conflict in Macedonia* (Syracuse, N.Y., Syracuse University Press, 2000); and interviews I conducted with Macedonian, U.S., and EU policy makers, Washington, D.C., September 2005.